CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President Mr. Mounir Zahran (Egypt)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 660th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I shall now make my opening statement in my capacity as the new President of the Conference on Disarmament.

Both I personally and my country, Egypt, are happy and honoured that I am assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this final stage of its plenary session in 1993. During the last few weeks of our work we will naturally be devoting ourselves to an important and difficult task. However, the cooperation of all will facilitate this task of drafting the report of the Conference on its plenary session in 1993. This period will also allow us to review the serious work that we have diligently carried out since January. We will be motivated by a desire to evaluate whatever progress we may have achieved. I am confident that, with the support of the secretariat under the wise leadership of Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and his efficient staff, the final phase of the work of the Conference will be crowned with success.

At the outset I wish to thank Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba for the excellent manner in which he has presided over our Conference during the past weeks. I look forward to ongoing fruitful cooperation with him during our weekly presidential consultations.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to warmly welcome our new colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament, namely Ambassadors Valentin Dobrev of Bulgaria, José Urrutia of Peru, Grigory Berdennikov of the Russian Federation and Baron Alain Guillaume of Belgium. I also wish to bid farewell and express my appreciation for the contributions made to the Conference on Disarmament by colleagues who have left us to take up new duties and responsibilities. I refer in particular to Ambassadors Michel Servais of Belgium, Serguei Batsanov of the Russian Federation and Celso Amorim of Brazil.

During the period from 28 to 30 June 1993, Cairo hosted the twenty-ninth regular session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, under the chairmanship of Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, for the second time in four years. At that meeting the 1993 Cairo Declaration on the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity was adopted. The Heads of State and Government of States members of the OAU noted in paragraph 14 of the Declaration that:

> "Security and stability have always been our priority concern at the national and regional levels for the achievement of development and integration in the socio-economic and cultural fields, in accordance with the aspirations of our Governments and peoples so that Africa could become a safe continent, free of weapons of mass destruction and free of all threats and pressures".

The Declaration further noted that "The establishment of peace and security ... will lead to the reduction of defence expenditure".

(The President)

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU also issued a Declaration in which a mechanism for conflicts prevention, management and resolution was set up. Such a mechanism will have a direct bearing on disarmament efforts in Africa, and falls within the context of the Secretary-General's agenda for peace issued by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as it is a mechanism of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.

Also in the African context is the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. You are well aware of the fact that a draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa is at an advanced stage of preparation, as a result of the constructive work carried out by a group of experts which was designated by the United Nations in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, and which held its last meeting at Harare in April 1993. The report of the group of experts will be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 47/76. We hope that the draft treaty will be finalized during 1994, with a view to paving the way for its signature and for the implementation of its provisions.

I wish to remind the Conference, on this occasion, of President Hosni Mubarak's 1990 proposal to establish in the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. This proposal remains a matter of high priority and we hope that tangible steps will be taken for its early implementation. I also wish to remind the Conference of the previous proposal which was submitted in 1974 to turn the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is also important to recall, on this occasion, the final document of the Tenth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Jakarta in September 1992, in which the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement expressed the hope that the new global environment would lead to "the renunciation of strategic doctrines based on the use of nuclear weapons and to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction". The leaders also noted that "the rational option is to seek security for all through total nuclear disarmament, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and through the balanced and progressive reductions of conventional armaments at the global and regional levels". The Jakarta Final Document also deplored "the lack of progress on measures to provide assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, while welcoming the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, gave priority to negotiations and other items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, such as a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear wars, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They emphasized the need to reinvigorate multilateral disarmament endeavours and, in this context, they called for broader and more active participation by non-aligned countries in the Conference on Disarmament.

(The President)

In this respect, it is worth quoting the Jakarta Message of the Tenth Non-Aligned Summit, which expressed deep concern at the negative impact of global military expenditure on the world economy:

> "Resources released through disarmament and arms reduction should be rechannelled towards the economic and social development of all countries and especially of the developing countries. This will at the same time facilitate the attainment of security at lower levels of armaments".

The conclusions of the Tenth Non-Aligned Summit in this regard were confirmed by the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly in its resolution 47/52 F, entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development", which was adopted in the General Assembly without a vote.

You will recall that, at the beginning of our session for this year, we adopted a nine-item agenda and we agreed to establish four ad hoc committees covering four priority items. The active and vigorous way in which the work of our Conference began this year was indeed encouraging under the wise presidency of Ambassador Celso Amorim, the former Ambassador of Brazil. It is worthwhile to recall here that, at the beginning of our session, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Mr. Amre Moussa, made a statement in the plenary of the Conference on 28 January 1993 in which he noted two fundamental criteria which should remain at the forefront of our concerns, firstly that security be achieved at lower levels of armament, and secondly that States have equal obligations and should make equal commitments in the field of disarmament.

The historic developments which we have recently witnessed with respect to the nuclear test ban are highly encouraging and welcome. They are a source of hope for us. I would like in this connection to congratulate the Governments of the United States, France and the Russian Federation for their decision to extend their voluntary nuclear testing moratoria and for their support for the early commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I also wish in this respect to express Egypt's full satisfaction at the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament, at the last meeting on 10 August held under the chairmanship of the Ambassador of Cuba, of a decision calling upon the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to conduct consultations during the inter-sessional period, that is from 3 September next to 17 January 1994, on the specific mandate for, and the organization of the negotiations for a CTBT. We hope that these consultations will yield positive results. Here I wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan, who has shown remarkable foresight in choosing to dedicate much of this year's time in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to expert presentations on the various aspects of verification of a CTBT. These presentations have helped us all to understand the benefits and drawbacks of each specific verification technique, be it seismic or non-seismic. We are now in a much better position to embark on an active negotiating process in the Ad Hoc Committee in accordance with operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 47/76.

(The President)

For its part, Egypt hopes that we can rapidly proceed to the adoption of a specific negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee and then go on to the negotiating phase on the basis of already existing drafts. In this respect we express our appreciation to the delegation of Sweden for the updated version of a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty contained in document CD/1202 and we will carefully study this draft. Egypt is prepared to make full use of the inter-sessional period so as to proceed as expeditiously as possible to that end.

With regard to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Egypt continues to hold the view that those States which have voluntarily rejected the nuclear option must be given comprehensive assurances against their being exposed to, or threatened by a nuclear attack. Such assurances, contained in an international legally-binding treaty, must be unconditional and in no way limited in scope, framework or duration. Furthermore, they must be negotiated multilaterally in conformity with General Assembly resolution 47/50 and, in particular, operative paragraph 7 of that resolution. Here I would like to make specific reference, with appreciation, to the proposal submitted by the delegation of Nigeria in document CD/768. I also wish to pay tribute to the efforts of Ambassador Neagu of Romania for the efforts he exerted during his chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee and during its deliberations on this very important item.

On this same question, I would simply like to add that we continue to believe that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) falls short of providing comprehensive security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States. It needs to be supplemented and we should try to cover this in the draft treaty referred to above. There is no doubt that the achievement of speedy progress in regard to a comprehensive nuclear test ban and full-scope nuclear security assurances in favour of the non-nuclear States would pave the way for the success of the review and extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the conference which is to be held for this purpose in the year 1995.

In our view, this treaty should be universal and so far it has not yet achieved its objective which, according to article 6 of the Treaty, is complete nuclear disarmament. It is worthy of mention that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, emphasized in his statement before this Conference on 28 January 1993, the question "how to ensure that the NPT, or the non-proliferation regime which has the NPT as its cornerstone, truly acquire a universal character. NPT parties and non-parties alike must find ways and means to achieve the objective of preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons". The 1995 NPT Conference provides us with an opportunity to come together and develop a new nuclear non-proliferation contract for the twenty-first century.

The Ad Hoc Committee for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, under the able guidance of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, has focused its attention this year on the issue of confidence-building measures. This trend is also reflected in the work of the friend of the Chairman on the legal and

(The President)

terminological matters as well as in the work of the three rounds of talks on confidence-building measures conducted by the three successive friends of the Chairman from the Russian Federation. Within this framework I would like to refer to the presentation made before this Ad Hoc Committee last week by the Egyptian expert, Dr. Muhammad Abdul Hadi, Chairman of the National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences in Egypt. This presentation made before the Ad Hoc Committee dealt with verification through the use of satellites as a confidence-building measure in the field of disarmament. He stressed, in particular, the need for developing countries to benefit from that technology in this vital sphere. Although we have always emphasized the usefulness of confidence-building measures, we nevertheless firmly believe that the discussion of those measures should in no way detract from the essential raison d'être of the establishment of this Committee; nor should the Committee's discussions be confined to confidence-building measures. In our view, the most effective confidence-building measure would be an overall negotiating mandate, which would allow us to ban all military activities in outer space.

This year the Conference on Disarmament has for the first time established an Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, in response to General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, operative paragraphs 12 to 15. During the second and third parts of the session, over which I had the honour to preside, the Committee has held substantive discussions on various aspects of transparency in armaments and numerous working papers and constructive proposals have been submitted on this important issue. The challenge still facing the Committee is to ensure the timely and successful completion of its work through fruitful discussions and an exchange of views on this issue.

Finally, I wish to pay a special tribute to my colleagues Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, for the excellent work that they have diligently carried out in connection with non-proliferation, enhancement of the Conference's effectiveness and expansion of its membership.

In concluding my statement on my assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, I wish to express my confidence that your cooperation will provide us with opportunities to succeed on the conclusion of this session on 6 September next.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, your rich and diverse experience, your many different titles and your commitment to such an international, universal and humanitarian cause as disarmament strengthen our belief that with your idealism and realism you will have a successful term of office.

Tribute is due to the competence and efficiency with which your predecessors in the chair, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba and Ambassador Hou Zhitong of China, directed our work.

Having had the privilege of representing Morocco in the Conference on Disarmament for eight years and having felt the frustration born of the

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

paralysis which afflicted it and of the peripheral role to which it was relegated because the code of conduct imposed by the cold war left the Conference in the inglorious position of taking note of matters concluded elsewhere and barred it from taking up the mandate it had been given, I am heartened, as my term of duty reaches its close, to be able to note how much progress has been made recently, progress that can be seen first and foremost in the change in attitudes. True, the upheavals on the world stage have played a large part in this.

The conclusion last year of the Chemical Weapons Convention enhanced the Conference's credibility and opened up new horizons for its work. The transitional phase it is now going through gives the Conference an opportunity to strengthen its structure, improve its functioning and go into matters more thoroughly, with a view to negotiating and concluding new agreements.

Continuing with this train of thought, my delegation is of the view that it is time to come up with appropriate answers to the issues of expanding the membership of the Conference and revising its agenda. My delegation, recognizing the added riches that diversity brings and the need for the Conference to adopt a political configuration better suited to the new realities, is in principle in favour of expansion provided that it does not denature the Conference's mandate as a negotiating body.

Revision of the agenda is also becoming necessary, the better to respond to priority concerns which require special attention. Concentration on a reduced number of topics where substantial progress is possible should not, however, divert us from subjects which could be revived at the right moment.

Here, two points seem to us to require attention: the nuclear test ban and security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The conditions are now to hand for furnishing the Conference with the instruments needed to begin negotiations in these two areas of fundamental importance for the maintenance and reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime.

In this regard, my delegation welcomes the positive attitude of the major nuclear Powers, which say they are ready to take part in negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear tests of all kinds. The impact such a treaty would have on the success of efforts to stop the qualitative improvement and proliferation of nuclear weapons is undeniable. My delegation hails the recent decision by the United States, France and Russia to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing. This decision will help to create a climate of confidence favourable to the opening of negotiations. The Conference, as the only multilateral body, is clearly the appropriate forum in which to conduct such negotiations. Hence my delegation welcomes the decision taken by the Conference on 10 August and hopes that the talks that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee will hold during the inter-sessional period to hammer out the details of the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate will be successful.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Besides dispelling all the concerns about environmental damage, a nuclear test ban would undoubtedly increase the chances of success at the NPT Review Conference for which preparations are already under way; the NPT is, in the eyes of the international community, an essential tool for the maintenance of peace and security. The ban would also illustrate the will of all nuclear Powers to embark upon general and complete nuclear disarmament, which alone can free humanity from this terrifying weapon whose use is a denial of the highest values of civilization.

Pending the attainment of this object, the non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to demand and obtain suitable assurances against the threat or use of such weapons. For this reason we favour the swift adoption of a legally binding international instrument.

In addressing this Conference for the last time, its senior, that is to say, longest-standing member cannot resist the temptation to proffer some personal comments.

Disarmament in the sense we understand it should, it seems to me, illustrate the conjunction of two kinds of intellectual process: action and deliberation. All of us, despite the individual styles we follow, seek to reconcile needs and aspirations, conventions and intellectual rules.

The Conference is not just a gathering of major Powers ever ready to ordain and dispose in matters of war and peace without regard for the rest. Interdependence must stop being regarded as an intellectual truism, because, for a global destiny in a world future from which no country can escape, the sharing of responsibility by all seems to be the only option that is convincing, credible and capable of promoting and preserving peace.

People have often tried to persuade themselves that discussions on disarmament were for nuclear-weapon States only, and this has led to forces being evaluated in terms of vectors and megatons and technology, in other words, to accounting in terms of death and destruction. Has there not been, because of efforts to ward off the possibility of a nuclear confrontation as an isolated event, a failure to analyse the situation on the planet, where there continue to be confrontations, involving more traditional means which lead just as surely to wasteful over-armament at the expense of development and to the formation of foci of tension that make the defences of peace very shaky.

Peace today is peace through disarmament, and disarmament is a serious and arduous undertaking that will remain apocryphal until the specific problem of verification has been resolved.

Peace and disarmament today represent the solution to a complex equation involving a multitude of variables from domains as different as science, patience and conscience. They require, too, an enabling spirit which I would describe as a particular kind of diplomacy which gives multilateral negotiations every chance.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

I would not like to close without welcoming our new colleagues, Ambassadors Valentin Dobrev of Bulgaria, José Urrutia of Peru, Grigory Berdennikov of the Russian Federation and Alain Guillaume of Belgium. They will, we are sure, make their contribution within this body towards the mobilization of consciences in the service of the clearest imperative of our age: making disarmament a reality deriving from a global policy in the service of peace and the survival of culture, in other words the survival of mankind. As an Arabic saying has it, if man wills, fate must needs respond.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Benhima, Morocco's representative in the Conference on Disarmament, for his valuable comments, his kind words concerning the presidency and his farewell statement, which we followed with great interest. Ambassador El Ghali Benhima is endowed with diplomatic skill and experience and remarkable qualities which we have all appreciated during the eight years in which he has represented his country at Geneva, especially in the Conference on Disarmament. He participated in the Conference for the first time in early February 1986 and I personally had the opportunity to realize the extent of his excellent qualities much earlier, since we made each other's acquaintance when I was serving as my country's ambassador to His Majesty's Government at Rabat.

One of the greatest experiences of my professional life was my period of service at Rabat and I have retained the best of memories of Morocco since that time. Ambassador Benhima is the dean of ambassadors accredited to the Conference on Disarmament. Although his influence on our work has certainly extended beyond that, it is worthwhile mentioning that his contribution to the work of the Conference was outstanding when he presided over the Conference at one of the most difficult and trying periods of its work. That is the mission I am assuming today.

We shall miss Ambassador Benhima, not only for his valuable contribution to the work of the Conference but also for his kind and warm personality which, together with his superb diplomatic abilities, will carry him far in the service of his country. On behalf of all of you, I should like to wish Ambassador and Mrs. Benhima every success and happiness in their future life.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. President, as this is the first occasion I am taking the floor under your presidency, let me congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency and assure you of my delegation's full support. You are the son of a great nation, representing one of the oldest civilizations, cultures and bureaucracies in the world. The Egyptian contributions to the work of the Conference on Disarmament stand out for their quality and eminence. The Netherlands enjoys excellent relations with the Arab Republic of Egypt. I hope that in my modest way I will be able to contribute under your presidency to the success of our Conference on Disarmament.

I would also like to express the gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba. It is with sadness that I listened to the farewell address of my long time neighbour, Ambassador El Ghani Benhima of Morocco. My best wishes accompany him for

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both his personal and professional future. At the same time I avail myself of this opportunity to welcome warmly the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium, our Benelux-partner, Ambassador Alain Baron Guillaume, as well as Ambassador Valentin Dobrev of Bulgaria and Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov of the Russian Federation.

Last Tuesday, 10 August 1993, the Conference on Disarmament achieved a genuine breakthrough. The Conference on Disarmament decided to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. Furthermore, the Conference requested the Chairman of its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to make the necessary arrangements to conduct consultations during the period between 3 September and 17 January on the specific mandate for, and the organization of, the negotiation.

The breakthrough on the test-ban negotiations has to be perceived in the broader context of general political developments outside the Conference, especially those that recently occurred. Inside the Conference the breakthrough was greatly facilitated by the recent initiative taken by the delegations of Australia, Mexico and Nigeria to introduce a pertinent draft decision. I would be remiss if I did not pay tribute to those three delegations, as well as to the then President, Ambassador Pérez Novoa, who availed himself in a most professional way of the opportunity offered.

This is an achievement by itself. Let us take advantage of this window of opportunity and not lose time on trivial procedures. Allow me, to present briefly the Netherlands' conceptualization of the test ban as an arms-control measure. Secondly, I would like to map out the views of my delegation on the specific modalities for our future negotiations.

First, the place of a test ban as an arms-control measure. We did at the time welcome the declaration of Vancouver of 4 April 1993 in which Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date. Looking at this decision in perspective, one could say that it was a landmark in a process: both a political one which saw a major transformation of the situation in Europe; and a corresponding evolutionary process in the notion of security: from nuclear forces becoming weapons of last resort in 1990, to important arms-control agreements (START-I, the Lisbon Protocol and START-II), to increased attention to non-proliferation in a diffuse and volatile world.

The recent decisions of the Presidents of France, Russia and the United States of 2 July to extend the moratoria on nuclear testing and thus to seek an end to nuclear testing altogether are another landmark in that process. Nuclear arms control and disarmament and the different security equation in the 1990s have thus greatly facilitated opportunities for negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

According to the Netherlands, an end to nuclear testing fits into the broad picture of international security related to nuclear weapons, both nuclear arms control and disarmament and the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of

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immediate relevance to worldwide security. The proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security, as indicated by the Security Council on 31 January 1992. A nuclear test ban would contribute to ongoing efforts to prevent States from developing a nuclear weapon programme.

A nuclear test ban remains therefore of paramount importance and my Government welcomes the prospects of early negotiations on a nuclear test ban in our Conference on Disarmament. These negotiations would inter alia enable the international community to witness the realization of the goals set out in both the PTBT and the NPT: a discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. This would no doubt further strengthen the international norm against non-proliferation as embodied in the NPT, the future of which will be discussed and decided not too long from now.

Now, some considerations on the specific modalities of our future negotiations. My Government looks forward to the early conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests, that is, not just nuclear weapons tests, but also the so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions". A total ban would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and complement the nuclear disarmament process.

Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament should be on the full set of issues relevant to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and not be limited to partial issues like verification. The ban must be negotiated here in Geneva, in the CD. It must subsequently have universal coverage: all States should abide by it. It should also be internationally and effectively verifiable. It is only thus that the goals of non-proliferation, to which we all profess to subscribe one way or another, can be served.

The issue of verification of a nuclear test ban has received attention in the CD since the 1970s. Extensive work on the seismic component, the core of the verification of a future test ban, has already been done. All along the Netherlands has gladly contributed to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. We are grateful for the promising results obtained so far. Preparations to test the full seismic component of the future verification system are well under way. In that respect the GSETT-3 exercise is of eminent importance. Other than seismic technologies will also be required, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Tanaka, for having guided us through a successful session concentrated on non-seismic techniques from which my delegation has drawn great benefit.

I am sure that Ambassador Tanaka's inter-sessional consultations - the new task entrusted to him by the Conference - will lay a sound foundation for the CD's work in 1994. I gladly pledge my delegation's complete and unreserved support for Ambassador Tanaka's efforts. I am confident the CD will be able to negotiate successfully a multi-faceted verification regime for a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

It is encouraging to note that the five declared nuclear-weapon States have stated that they will engage in consultations here in Geneva parallel to the work in the CD and on the same subjects as addressed by the CD. In the CD, such consultations could well result in a coordinated effort and input in the CD negotiations, allowing these to move swiftly and expeditiously. Although setting precise time-frames for the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament does not seem appropriate today, we would expect them to be brought to fruition in not too distant a future.

Through its breakthrough of 10 August, the Conference on Disarmament reached a landmark. We witness the beginning of a new process which will, within a short period of time, lead to full-fledged negotiations, unconditional if you prefer that qualification, on a nuclear test ban. We are at a starting point. Let us not make a false start!!

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Wagenmakers, the representative of the Netherlands, for his statement and for the warm words he addressed to the Chair and the kind words addressed to my country.

Mr. SEMICHI (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, it is with pleasure that I take the floor as you take the presidency of this Conference. It is certainly a good omen that our session in 1993 will conclude under your authority as the representative of Egypt. Your talents as a diplomat and your skills as a negotiator will ensure that the Conference is successful in its deliberations and will unquestionably be of effective and decisive help in the preparation of the final report on the 1993 session.

Allow me also to express my delegation's thanks and to renew the expression of its esteem to the Cuban delegation for its exemplary discharge of its task during the preceding presidency of the Conference.

I am taking the floor to express my delegation's views on the results of the work of the Conference this year. I should also like to take the opportunity, since my mission in Geneva is coming to an end, to make some practical comments inspired by my years of work in the Conference on Disarmament.

When it took over the presidency of this body last year, the Algerian delegation, through its Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a fairly exhaustive statement on all matters concerning disarmament. Thus it was able to raise its main concerns, which are, basically, those of all the non-aligned countries. Even if we believe today that the reaffirmation of positions of principle often yields little progress in the Conference's negotiations, we do think that reminders of some questions that were included in the agenda this year precisely because all member States felt them to be urgent can be useful.

I will begin by expressing the relief felt by the entire international community at the agreement just reached on the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, agreement made possible by the nuclear Powers' courageous decisions to extend the moratoriums on nuclear tests. The urgency of concluding a test-ban treaty is becoming ever greater with the approach of the

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deadline of 1995, a date that will undoubtedly bring a clarification of many countries' nuclear options, and that precisely in the light of the results of the Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In this respect I would like to remind the Conference that in recent years the international community has on several occasions spelt out the philosophical basis for a comprehensive test ban by describing such a ban as the first step towards a totally denuclearized world. It has never been a matter of giving legal sanction to a situation by definitively dividing the world into countries which have nuclear weapons and countries which do not. My country is anxious that this aspect of the negotiations should not be overlooked, particularly now that, after years of shilly-shallying and after having described the halting of tests as an ideal, the representatives of certain nuclear Powers seem to wish to convince us that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has created a special category of subjects of international law, what the nuclear Powers call "legitimate" nuclear Powers, as opposed to other Powers or States that they designate by the strongly negative term "proliferators".

That is not merely a rhetorical device, but, just as it would be unrealistic to think that States that have expended huge amounts of effort and money in the context of nuclear rivalry will unilaterally get rid of their arsenals, so it would be unrealistic to think that the current non-nuclear-weapon States, some of which suffered from foreign domination for centuries, will agree to the perpetual minimization of their status as subjects of international law and grant a limited group of Powers the option of nuclear blackmail. That is why, in our view, real deterrence, deterrence that is politically legitimate and acceptable from the humanitarian point of view, is deterrence that, drawing on the principle of the equality of the rights of States and peoples, is founded on the idea that no State should possess categories of weapons that are, as a matter of principle, prohibited for other States. At this stage of international relations, that may seem utopian. None the less, humanity must work to that end in order to preserve international peace and security.

Like the majority of the members of the international community, we do not subscribe to the idea that adherence to a convention that limits or prohibits in itself constitutes good international conduct. On the contrary, we are convinced that it is practical and voluntary respect in good faith of both the letter and the spirit of such a convention - even if scruples of principle may momentarily prevent formal adherence - which establishes the proper norm of international conduct. In the same way, we believe that the value of agreements to reduce or ban weapons should not be undermined by a purely formal legalism which, based on the idea that anything that is not formally prohibited is permitted, would lead to a never-ending race between technology and international security arrangements. When we see that there was an interval of nearly 50 years between the beginning of nuclear testing and the emergence of consensus to end it, or when we know that it took a century from the time of their first use for chemical weapons to be formally

(Mr. Semichi, Algeria)

banned by an international convention, it is tempting to agree with the sceptics who feel that the world will never be safe from weapons of mass destruction.

The dominant powers long interpreted multilateral treaties so as to legitimize their preeminence, which was often only that of their weapons. At the same time they refused to admit that the continuation of a race to develop ever more sophisticated arms with ever more "surgical" accuracy was less a reflection of real security or defence needs than of their inability to undertake the necessary conversion of their cumbersome arms industries. The pretext of the cold war no longer being valid, those with direct interests in the military-industrial complexes are now seeking among the upheavals of all sorts shaking the countries of the South elements which might serve as an excuse for their Governments to apply the old policies, either by intervention in the internal disputes of the weaker countries or by maintenance of a frantic rate of renewal of the military technologies that destabilize the balances needed for peace, revive the climate of uncertainty and suspicion and swallow up the funds needed for development. In this respect, my country feels that the excessive arms manufacturing capacity in certain countries and those same countries' propensity systematically to seek military uses for all the fruits of human genius fundamentally discredit their professed commitments to transparency or disarmament. Transparency must not, we feel, be used to distract attention from the need to put an end to the arms race and to undertake the conversion of the tools of arms production.

Furthermore, while there is general agreement that, to be lasting, arms limitation measures should be taken in parallel with the settlement of regional disputes, there is also a need for consensus on the idea that such measures should not serve as a cover for a desire to dismantle the defence potential of countries designated as culprits in advance or the objective of protecting one of the protagonists in situations of regional rivalry. It is obvious that international disputes often have an effect on the internal affairs of neighbouring countries that are not direct parties to them. More precisely, we believe that there is a lesson to be learnt from this for us all, so that there is no recurrence of the process of over armament and destruction of which a country in the Middle East has been subject, a process of which, in the final analysis, the only beneficiaries have been arms industries. Similarly, we must ask ourselves whether it is right to provide a State party to a regional conflict with the means to enable it to perpetrate an avowed policy of hegemony and domination.

I would now like to draw your attention to the concern we feel at the lack of progress in the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances. It is, candidly, deplorable that 14 years after its foundation this Committee should still be reporting at the end of each session what can only be termed an inability to overcome the challenge facing it because of the refusal of certain nuclear Powers to guarantee their due to States that have voluntarily forsworn the nuclear option.

(Mr. Semichi, Algeria)

Our concern also extends to the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space and the misunderstanding that characterizes the discussions in it, a misunderstanding which has become even more evident this year. Having now been in existence for nine years, this Committee has, we feel, accumulated sufficient expertise to move on to a more specific stage in the definition of its future tasks. Although our position is clearly reflected in the declaration of the Group of 21 made in the Ad Hoc Committee on 3 August, we feel that, once the Committee has a sound negotiating mandate, the current efforts to explore the means of reaching agreement on confidence-building measures should be separated from the question that led to the establishment of this Committee, that is, preventing the militarization of outer space by drawing up a multilateral treaty. In our view, the two items are neither competitors, nor mutually exclusive or interdependent and we can perfectly well deal with them in separate working groups providing there is consensus that neither of them should be given priority over the other.

Permit me now to share with you a few thoughts on the question of the enlargement of the Conference. We have often heard here the argument that the composition, the agenda and the methods of work of the Conference on Disarmament are based on cold-war criteria and should, for that precise reason, be radically transformed because the world has become multipolar and is therefore more open to democratization of international relations. It must be said, however, that that democratization is not yet visible in practice and that the international community's inability to overcome some of its most serious problems, despite the willingness of the majority of States, is striking proof that the real centres of decision-making in world affairs are still in the hands of a limited number of Powers.

That said, and even if we are definitely in favour of the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament, we do not think that the current composition of the Conference no longer reflects the state of the world. Furthermore, we do not think that the Conference's decisions that might, even in the event of perpetuation of the current situation, fail to take sufficiently into account the interests of States which are not represented here. The Conference on Disarmament is not a club of States that have co-opted each other, but the result of long negotiations held in Geneva and New York to ensure the most equitable representation of the various groups of States in the world. In this sense, the Conference on Disarmament as now composed represents a fairly full sample of the various trends.

It is, indeed, diversity of expression and views that have characterized the activities of the Conference on Disarmament from the outset and that explains the interest shown by the community of nations in those activities, an interest demonstrated by the requests for admission as members or observers, by the welcome given to, inter alia, the Convention on Chemical Weapons recently produced by the CD, or again, by the unanimity with which the participants in the special session of the First Committee acknowledged that the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament is a matter for the Conference itself to deal with. These elements show that the Conference on Disarmament is not an institution at risk of disaffection by an international community deprived of truly multilateral negotiating organs.

(Mr. Semichi, Algeria)

Every possible comment has already been made about the ideal composition of the Conference on Disarmament. I will therefore simply review the points that, to our way of thinking, should prevail in dealing with this question, the greatest of our concerns being to preserve the general characteristics of the Conference today. That is because experience has amply shown the shortcomings, not to say the paralysis, that affect negotiating bodies which are too open-ended, particularly when they have to take their decisions on a consensus basis. To expand the CD without maintaining its efficiency would be to block its work and empty it of its substance.

On the other hand expansion of the membership of the Conference is now an urgent concern, particularly as a result of the legitimate pressure by States which applied for admission years ago, thereby showing their will to strengthen the intellectual, moral and political potential of this body.

My delegation does not think that expansion should be based on the particular capacities of the candidate to contribute to the activities of the Conference on Disarmament. Such an approach, by penalizing the States whose political will is constrained only by material factors, would risk increasing the already substantial share of the countries of the North in the membership of the Conference, or indeed of transforming the Conference into an offshoot of the CSCE. Nor can we accept the suggestion that only States which have a certain military capacity should be admitted and that members considered insufficiently active should be excluded. Such a departure would be tantamount to transforming the Conference into a forum that would discuss only the concerns of the most powerful States, an instrument of which we do not see how or why it would be sensitive to the security needs of the rest of the international community.

However, we firmly believe that the enlargement of the Conference should be undertaken immediately, taking into account the requirements of balance between regions and cultures - political conduct and solidarity being, as a general rule, based on such considerations - and candidates' usual conduct with regard to the concerns of the international community, conduct that can readily be verified from the respect those States show for the decisions and resolutions of United Nations organs.

In our view, the Conference needs neither chosen nations nor States that set themselves outside the international community.

Before concluding, I would like to stress that if the idea that we should have a Conference with 60 members is accepted, we think that the decision proposing such a change that is submitted to the General Assembly should contain a provision opening the way to the subsequent periodic, regular and limited enlargement of the Conference. That would dedramatize the question of the participation of candidates not chosen in this first phase of enlargement and spare us a repetition of the difficulties we have encountered on this point since the creation of this body.

At all events, the delegations which have expressed their desire to become full members of the Conference have already found in the person of

(Mr. Semichi, Algeria)

Ambassador O'Sullivan their best advocate and the best negotiator for the honourable settlement of this problem. The Algerian delegation supports the action of this special rapporteur and wishes him every success in his efforts to reconcile the many concerns that have been communicated to him by delegations and that, we are sure, he will reflect in his conclusions.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Abdelhamid Semichi, the Permanent Representative of Algeria, for his statement, which we followed with interest. I also thank him for his kind words addressed to me. We have heard that Ambassador Abdelhamid Semichi will soon be leaving us. The Conference on Disarmament will thereby lose not only a kind friend but also an experienced and able diplomat who, throughout his period of service at Geneva, where he has represented his country in the Conference on Disarmament, has been eager to establish friendly relations with us all. He assumed the presidency of the Conference in 1992 and bore that responsibility with his outstanding diplomatic ability and superb personal qualities. He made a diligent contribution on numerous issues and substantive matters raised at the Conference and, when he leaves Geneva in a few weeks' time, he will have left his mark on our work through the endeavours that he has made representing his country in the Conference. I wish him and his wife every success in their personal and professional life.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to felicitate you on your assumption of the presidency of this august forum at a time of crucial importance. It is important because we are in the process of taking stock of our achievements for this year, and crucial because we have been presented with an excellent opportunity in the sphere of disarmament that should not be allowed to slip away from us. We repose the fullest confidence in your ability of steering the work of the Conference towards the realization of our long-awaited goals. My delegation assures you of its full cooperation in fulfilling your responsibilities.

May I also take this opportunity to convey our sincere appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba and his delegation for the excellent manner in which they guided the work of the Conference. My delegation joins the previous speakers in warmly welcoming our new colleagues Ambassador Dobrev of Bulgaria, Ambassador Berdennikov of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Saboia of Brazil, Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium, and Ambassador Urrutia of Peru.

President Clinton's recent announcement extending the United States moratorium on nuclear testing has generated a worldwide response rekindling the long felt need to commence concrete negotiations of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban regime on a solid footing. This is a welcome sign in the field of disarmament. The Government of Sri Lanka welcomed the United States initiative with enthusiasm. Similarly, Sri Lanka is further encouraged by the announcements made by the Russian Federation and France, which reinforce international endeavours towards nuclear disarmament. My delegation sincerely welcomes similar commitments from the remaining two nuclear Powers, which will no doubt further consolidate the nuclear disarmament initiatives, including the conclusion of a CTB.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

We are convinced that a multilaterally-negotiated CTB will constitute one of the main universal instruments to hold back nuclear-weapons proliferation, both vertical as well as horizontal, and to reverse the nuclear arms race in this post-cold-war era.

My delegation is heartened by the decision of the Conference to initiate the negotiation to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which has long been a goal of the international community in this regard. I wish to register my delegation's sincere appreciation to the delegations of Australia, Mexico and Nigeria who jointly put forward the original proposal, thus enabling us to take the above decision. Sri Lanka fully shares the thrust and the main objective of this proposal, namely to give a negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to undertake multilateral negotiation to conclude a universally applicable and internationally verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The draft mandate presented by Australia in keeping with the spirit of the above proposal equally deserves the support of the member States.

As the Chairman of the G-21 stated, I wish to underline the desirability of commencing consultations in the Ad Hoc Committee, beginning in the inter-sessional period this year, with a view to concluding negotiation of a CTB by the end of 1994.

My delegation recognizes the considerable preparatory inputs so far contributed by the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Tanaka of Japan and his predecessors. We also note with satisfaction the valuable contribution of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and other experts who presented various non-seismic verification methods. My delegation associates itself with the views of many other delegations that the verification regime, being one of the most important aspects of the CTB, should be an internationally verifiable one. In this context, the seismic methods should constitute the core of such a verification regime, due to the fact that the international community in general has wider accessibility to such standard techniques and in view of their cost-effectiveness in comparison to non-seismic techniques.

My delegation also appreciated the valuable contribution of the Swedish delegation, particularly by presenting its revised draft proposal for a CTB which is now being studied in our capital. While awaiting observations from relevant national authorities, we hope that this draft proposal will receive the consideration it merits when the Ad Hoc Committee commences its negotiations.

Another area of great concern to non-nuclear-weapon States such as mine is the issue of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the potential use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The question that remains so far unanswered is about the price the non-nuclear-weapon States have to pay for their voluntary option not to acquire nuclear weapons. The present system as it prevails unfairly narrows the scope of international guarantees for security of

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

non-nuclear-weapons States. It should also be emphasized that for any collective international security assurance to be non-discriminatory, such an arrangement should essentially be premised upon a universal, and legally binding international treaty providing negative as well as positive security assurances. In this regard my delegation shares the view of the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States that, with the exception of the one declared by China, the unilateral declarations of security assurances against potential use of nuclear weapons are inherently flawed due to the fact that such assurances are limited in scope and are conditional. In view of their very unilateral nature, which does not warrant any international accountability, they are legally non-binding.

My delegation sincerely appreciates the work undertaken by the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances under the able leadership of its Chairman, Ambassador Neagu of Romania. The exploratory and determined efforts by Ambassador Neagu and the concern echoed time and again by the majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States have highlighted the urgent need for legally binding, universally applicable non-discriminatory and comprehensive security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is the sincere view of my delegation that the time is now ripe for us to address this issue of utmost importance in a concrete manner.

The States parties to the NPT are passing through a preparatory process for the 1995 NPT Conference. Conclusion of a CTB as well as concrete and positive measures to conclude a multilaterally negotiated universal treaty for negative and positive security assurances until such time the existing nuclear arsenals are completely eliminated and the nuclear arms race put to an end will strengthen our hands to consider the question of indefinite extension of the NPT when we face the 1995 Review Conference. In these disarmament endeavours my delegation will continue to cooperate with this Conference as well as with other fora. Success in such international disarmament endeavours, including nuclear disarmament, will be one of the main pillars of a stable new world order, to which we have been aspiring all along.

In conclusion my delegation wishes to convey its appreciation to Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, who during the past several months conducted exhaustive consultations with a view to submitting his recommendations as to how the CD should be expanded in keeping with the geopolitical realities of today. My delegation will give its serious consideration to his report and express our views on the matter in due course. I would be failing in my duty if I did not seize this opportunity to express my delegation's sincere gratitude to Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico for their valuable inputs to our work on the issues relating to non-proliferation and improved and effective functioning of the CD respectively. Finally, Mr. President, I wish to join you and previous speakers in wishing Ambassador Benhima of Morocco who actively participated in the work of the CD and shared his wisdom with all of us. My delegation extends its best wishes for his personal happiness and success. May we also extend our best wishes to Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, who is also leaving us in the near future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Goonetilleke, the representative of Sri Lanka, for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the Chair.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, I am particularly glad to take the floor under your chairmanship in view of the very good bilateral relations between Australia and Egypt, in view also of the very happy memories that I have of working with you in Cairo when I had the privilege of a posting there and especially in view of your great personal standing in our Conference. I assure you of the full support of my delegation, which I hope you will know goes without saying. I would also like to thank Ambassador Pérez Novoa for the very energetic and very effective work that went on under his presidency. I should also like to express the thanks of my delegation to Ambassador Benhima of Morocco for his service and for his leadership and not least for his wise comments earlier this morning. Similarly, I would like to express my disappointment at the forthcoming conclusion of Ambassador Semichi's assignment here. Our Conference will be diminished by his absence. I trust, however, this will not be the conclusion of his service to the international community which, in my view, he is uniquely well positioned to make.

On 28 January this year, the Conference appointed me as its Special Cooruinator for the issue of expanding its membership. This decision to appoint a Special Coordinator came in the light of the report presented on 18 January by the former President of the Conference, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, who in conjunction with Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, had held consultations in the second half of 1992 on this matter. At an earlier point there had also been an effort to have a small expansion of the Conference, but that effort was ultimately unsuccessful.

The view that the time has come for the Conference to expand its membership has been sharpened by the successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That outcome has been widely applauded internationally and has undoubtedly stimulated interest in membership of the Conference, not least amongst those who have been waiting for many years to have their applications considered.

It is also the case that, with the ending of the cold war, there are many new opportunities for the international community to address the politico-military challenges in new and hopefully more effective ways. In the new environment it is clear that many governments see an enhanced role for the Conference on Disarmament.

Thus the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post cold war era" received a ready response from the Conference on Disarmament, and many representatives from here participated in the resumed First Committee in March this year. At that resumed session there were many expressions of support for the determination of the Conference on Disarmament to review its membership and its agenda in the new circumstances.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

With this background in mind, I held bilateral discussions with each of my colleagues on several occasions, and also with each of the CD groups. I thus obtained first hand a sense of what outcome could be tolerable to all, at the same time registering what were the sensitivities and aspirations of each CD member. I circulated a survey which was designed to allow any comments that members wished to have recorded. I considered holding informal open-ended consultations on this matter but at the request of a number of delegations who wished me not to proceed in that way, I decided to proceed in the way that I have described.

It quickly became apparent that a discussion of criteria for membership would lead only to indefinite delay. Attempts to define in some "objective" way the criteria for membership flew in the face of the history of previous efforts at expansion of the Conference which had not previously been able to define such criteria, of its current composition and of the widely varying views about what such criteria might be, how they could be defined and in what way they might be applied. I decided a more practical course was to try to find an acceptable outcome.

Finding an acceptable outcome was made easier by the fact that there seemed to be very broad acceptance that the CD should remain a negotiating body and thus of limited composition, that its rule of consensus should remain, and that it should concentrate on developing agreements and treaties in the field of security, arms control and disarmament. Thus it was possible to pose the question "given the things that we agree the Conference should do, and given the expressions of interest by those who are willing to participate in its work, who is not currently a member who ought to be included?" This formulation also had the advantage of drawing attention to the tasks to be done rather than any artificial criteria.

In seeking to find a proposal that would be acceptable to all members of the Conference, there were three particular problems that needed to be overcome. Firstly there was the question of procedure: was the Conference entirely autonomous in its decision over its own membership? Some in the Conference answered unambiguously yes; others had a more nuanced approach, others said no. The conclusion I drew was that in its process of considering the recommendation for expansion, the Conference should follow procedures that avoided raising the in-principle question of its status vis-à-vis the General Assembly. I outline some suggestions at the end of this report which follow precisely the precedent established in 1978.

Secondly, there was considerable hesitation about the addition of new members which raised particularly sensitive issues for some countries. While those sensitivities remain, I believe that they will not be such as to prevent the adoption of the recommendation for a new CD composition attached to this report.

Thirdly there was naturally considerable interest in the overall balance that might emerge from any expansion. Here several aspects are worth recording. While a number of countries preferred a relatively small expansion - by say 10-12 - it quickly became clear that within such a small

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

expansion it would be impossible to satisfy the competing regional, political, geostrategic and other claims. Equally it also became clear that a large expansion - including the idea that all who applied should be admitted - could not attract consensus. It emerged that between these contending views, common ground might be found around an expansion to about 60 members. This number had the additional benefit of representing about one third of United Nations members, which is approximately the same proportion of the United Nations membership that the original CD represented when it was established.

An additional benefit of an expansion to about 60 is that it creates enough manoeuvrability to accommodate a wide variety of applicant countries. In considering the question of expansion, I reluctantly came to the view that I would not recommend for inclusion countries which had chosen not to apply: this despite the fact that several countries who are not applicants would seem to have strong credentials.

Thus I came to the conclusion that the only way forward at this stage was to recommend a limited expansion from amongst the current applicants in a way that leads overall to a Conference capable of addressing the problems and opportunities before it.

In considering how to strike a balance in the context of the expansion, I also had to take account of the fact that the Conference had a very particular origin and that within its original groupings there were some unusual features. Nor was I given the task of changing the current composition or of reconstructing the Conference. I asked if any current members wished to withdraw but none did. My recommendation preserves closely the balance in the CD at present if the current members were considered from a United Nations General Assembly regional perspective. It is also balanced in overall geostrategic terms.

On the last page of this report and an integral part of it is my recommendation for a composition for the Conference, with the new members representing the expansion being underlined. I would like to emphasize that this recommendation is part of a phased approach, since the extension of the composition of the Conference is a dynamic process, and will no doubt be subject to periodic reviews in the future. It may be argued that there are other possible ways of achieving this result. I can only say that my recommendation represents my best estimate of an approach which is likely to attract consensus.

Mr. President, I assume that in due course you will ask the Conference to decide on this report. If the Conference is willing to accept this recommendation, in line with the practice established in 1978 when the Conference itself was constituted, I suggest that the CD President inform the President of the General Assembly of the agreement reached following appropriate consultations in the Conference on Disarmament, and in line with document A/S-10/24 of 19 September 1978 invite the President of the Assembly to so inform the States Members of the United Nations. The new members would then assume their membership at the start of the 1994 session.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

I ask that this report be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. President, I would like to add a couple of words after this conclusion of the presentation of my report. I should just like to emphasize that the report and its attached recommendation represents a very delicate package. It contains inevitably a series of balances and, of course, it will be very easy to unravel. I hope, however, that delegates and officials in capitals will study the report carefully and objectively. If an expansion is to be achieved, a degree of self-respect, mutual respect and restraint will be required. I would like to conclude, therefore, by thanking the many colleagues for their expressions of support and solidarity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador O'Sullivan, the representative of Australia, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. In introducing his report on this subject of the expansion of the Conference, Ambassador O'Sullivan asked that his report be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and I think we have to act accordingly.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: We shall return to that report in due course in view of the last portion of the statement of Ambassador O'Sullivan, that this matter will be considered and we will come back to it at a later stage.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I take the floor in plenary under your chairmanship, let me join previous speakers in congratulating you on your assumption of your office, in thanking your predecessor, Ambassador Pérez Novoa for the enormously significant results achieved during his own presidency, and in expressing the greatest sadness at the impending departures of Ambassadors El Ghali Benhima and Abdelhamid Semichi. I will have the occasion of welcoming our new colleagues in the later statement.

I intend to react briefly to the interesting statement we have just heard from Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, the contents of which have caught my delegation and most other delegations with some surprise. The question of the essential need for the expansion of the CD in an effort to increase the effectiveness and representativity of this negotiating body in the face of a rapidly changing world is one of the most important and far-reaching decisions that this body will consider and hopefully take this year. That is why one of the most prominent and responsible members of the Conference was charged with the onerous and thankless task of conducting consultations on the criteria to be followed in suggesting an expanded membership and on identifying prospective candidates whose presence in our midst would give our work and negotiations even better chances of objective oriented success. You must allow me, therefore, to express some surprise at the sudden tabling of the results of the consultations with individual members directly in plenary, without going through the normal procedures which we have always tried to follow, of transparent discussions in subsequent open-ended consultations,

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

or through Group Coordinators in the first place and thereafter in informal plenaries before the actual tabling of drafts which must perforce command ultimate consensus. We will now have the very difficult task of attempting to decipher the criteria which have been used, the balances which exist or which may be missing and the implications of a package draft which may become a "take-it-or-leave-it" package merely because no open-ended consultations have taken place on its constituent elements. I say that because, at first view, at least one State with nuclear weapons on its soil is not on this list. We are thus being asked to evaluate a prepackaged basket without having the opportunity of participating fully in the choice of its contents through open discussions. Those discussions on evaluation will now have to take place ex post facto. My delegation believes that is most unfortunate on an issue of such importance, but, having said that, I assure you that we will, of course, participate fully and with an open mind in the hope that the CD will see an expanded membership before this year is out.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Kamal for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair and, as we have agreed, we shall return to that report in due course.

That concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

I give the floor to the representative of Tunisia.

Mr. BAATI (Tunisia) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on your accession to the presidency of the Conference. Thanks to your eminent diplomatic qualities and abilities, the Conference is assured of success in this decisive phase when it is about to begin producing its report to the General Assembly.

I would also thank Ambassador Berasategui and his staff for their untiring efforts to facilitate our work.

I would also like to congratulate Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, on his efforts and on the report he has just presented to us. I have taken note of its contents and I will not fail to transmit it to my authorities. Obviously, that report is for us a source of frustration and surprise, as the Ambassador of Pakistan so well put it. My authorities will scrutinize the report and will note that my country, which was one of the first to apply for admission, is not on the list compiled by Ambassador O'Sullivan.

I would like through you, Mr. President, to ask Ambassador O'Sullivan a few questions to assist my authorities in studying the report. I would like to ask Ambassador O'Sullivan to tell me, since you said that we could come back to this topic, whether he can reply now or later. Firstly, how far does he feel his report takes account of the views expressed by my country on several occasions, in particular during the consultations organized by Ambassadors Servais and Amorim? I would like at this stage to pay tribute to them and wish them every success in their new functions. I would also like to ask Ambassador O'Sullivan how far he took into account the criterion of

(Mr. Baati, Tunisia)

chronology, that is to say the order in which requests for admission were submitted, in drawing up his report. Those are the questions and comments brought to my mind by the statement we have just heard.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to ask Ambassador O'Sullivan, the representative of Australia, if he has any reaction to the queries or questions put by the representative of Tunisia at this stage, or if he prefers to react later on, as we have agreed that we will come back to this question at a later stage.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): I thank the delegations which have given early reactions. It probably would suit everyone's convenience to have a little bit of time to consider the matter and then to hear views, and I would be happy to participate, of course, in any such discussions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador O'Sullivan for his reaction and may we now proceed with our remaining business for today.

May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our work for today. Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I would recall that, as announced earlier today, immediately after this meeting the Conference will hold an informal open-ended consultation, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Kamal, on the optical disk system being developed by the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 17 August, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.660/Corr.1
12 November 1993

ENGLISH

ARABIC, ENGLISH, FRENCH and SPANISH only

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Mounir Zahran (Egypt)

Corrigendum

Bottom of page 4, last line

For General Assembly resolution 47/76 read 47/47

Page 5, 2nd paragraph, end line 9

For operative paragraph 7 read 5

Page 6, 4th paragraph, line 4

For 6 September read 3 September

GE.93-62708

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.661
17 August 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Mounir Zahran (Egypt)

GE.93-62099 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 661st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish to recall that immediately after this plenary meeting the Conference will hold informal open-ended consultations on its improved and effective functioning under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmed Kamal, the representative of Pakistan.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representative of the Russian Federation, Mr. Valery Zemskov, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. ZEMSKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): It is my understanding that today I will be the only speaker to address this meeting and this makes me feel particularly responsible. I hope that I won't disappoint you with my statement.

First of all, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, upon your assuming the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament. The very first plenary meeting conducted under your leadership shows clearly that the Conference on Disarmament is in reliable and competent hands. Our delegation will be greatly pleased to support you fully in your important duties.

Let me also express our gratitude to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Novoa of Cuba, for the skill and tireless efforts he applied to leading the Conference and achieving practical results.

In my statement today I would like specifically to dwell on just one issue, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery. This topic is not new. It is present in one form or another in practically all statements and declarations made by the participants in the Conference. Moreover, there is a danger that it may simply be "talked to death", so emptying a problem of vital importance for all of mankind of its substantive content. At the same time, the realities of our time with its substantial results in restraining the arms race, results that create new, sometimes even more complex tasks, call for further and still more active efforts from the world community with respect to consolidation of the accomplishments in the field of disarmament and conscientious implementation of the disarmament and arms control agreements. Now, when the disarmament processes have begun to yield their first major fruits, no one should have any justification whatsoever for seeking out and acquiring means and technologies of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless the situation regarding these issues is not clear-cut and many facts confirm that the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical or biological, remains a cause of concern in the world.

What conclusion can be drawn from this? We believe that the global non-proliferation regimes already created should be supported by concrete steps and practical arrangements concerning a number of issues that would inter alia take into account regional particularities and would be aimed at those regions and countries that cause concern as regards non-proliferation. In other words, there is a need for a clear and realistic programme of measures to strengthen and improve existing regimes. The solution of this

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problem would have a positive effect on the establishment and strengthening of a new political climate of cooperation and confidence in this post-confrontation period. On the success of our efforts in this respect there will also depend the outcome of the 1995 conference that is to decide what we view as the vital issue of the unlimited extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In short, in implementing its foreign policy, including in the field of international security, the Russian Federation will continue to give priority to the non-proliferation problem.

While proposing that an intensive dialogue on this issue should be begun within the framework of the leading disarmament forum that our Conference is, the Russian delegation would like to focus your attention on the following major practical issues, progress on which could, in our opinion, substantially improve the situation as regards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. First Russia attaches particular, priority importance to the preservation and comprehensive reinforcement of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We intend to ensure that the 1968 Treaty becomes universal and that the 1995 Conference makes it of unlimited duration. In this context we proceed from the premise that full-fledged participation in this treaty by three former Republics of the USSR, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as non-nuclear States would be an important, maybe even decisive factor of the conservation of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The position of principle of the Russian Federation on this issue is well known and is not subject to any adjustment.

Furthermore the initiation of multilateral negotiations on the elaboration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would contribute effectively to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the success of the 1995 conference. The consensus decision by our forum on this issue was highly appreciated in Moscow. For the first time in the long history of discussion of this problem, all five nuclear Powers, together with other participants in the Conference, agreed to work for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This step taken by the Conference is, of course, only the beginning of painstaking work on the text of the treaty and we intend to take a very active part in this endeavour. It is important to ensure that this process continues in a favourable atmosphere of silence at the nuclear test sites.

Our approaches to the practical side of this issue, that is how to organize the negotiations, have already been outlined. I would like to confirm that we are in favour of parallelism in the negotiating process: on the one hand, multilateral negotiations within the framework of this CD in accordance with a clear mandate defining the specific parameters of such negotiations and the scope of the problems, and on the other hand consultations among the five nuclear Powers as an important element of the overall work on the treaty.

To move on to another point, the Russian Federation continues to have negative security assurances for non-nuclear States at the forefront of its disarmament agenda. Given the importance of resolving this task in the

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context of the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, our delegation supports the beginning of concrete negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in order to elaborate an appropriate multilateral agreement or convention. We believe that over the past 10 years and more this problem has been comprehensively examined in our forum. Many delegations' positions have gelled - in favour, we would hope, of such an instrument, and of one containing a common formula for negative assurances. The time has come for practical work on a text, for the laying down on paper of individual provisions and whole sections of the future agreements.

For its part, the Russian delegation will try to make its contribution to the preparation of a final product, first of all from the point of view of searching for a mutually acceptable wording for assurances. In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to the language contained in our statement concerning assurances of Ukraine's security. It reads:

> "The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, armed forces or allies conducted by a State of this kind that is linked by an agreement of association with a nuclear-weapon State or that acts together with, or with the support of a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out such an attack".

Of course, the language elaborated by other delegations to the Conference on Disarmament is of great practical value. In particular, we believe that the well-known proposals made by the delegations of Nigeria and France could be used successfully.

In sum, all the prerequisites are to hand for the resolution of this important issue. All interested States members of the Conference should now demonstrate political will, an appropriate response to the needs of the time.

Second, in the context of the non-proliferation problem, I would like to put particular emphasis on issues related to the policy of the international community in the field of nuclear fissionable materials produced for nuclear weapons purposes. A lot has been said on this topic as well, with particular attention given to the risk of stockpiling excessive amounts of fissionable materials and the need to establish strict controls and restrictions on such materials. It seems that in this area as well we need to move from words to deeds.

We propose the beginning in the Conference on Disarmament of substantive negotiations on the elaboration of a multilateral (meaning, of course, with the participation of all nuclear and "threshold" States) agreement on the controlled cessation of the production of fissionable materials. We proceed from the assumption that in the context of such an agreement there will probably be a need for an arrangement whereby all nuclear Powers place the weapons-related materials freed as a result of nuclear arms reductions under international control under the aegis of IAEA. The issue of the exchange of

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data on the amounts of such materials and facilities for storing them could be resolved within the framework of such arrangements.

Third, our delegation, understanding the importance of the issue of the transparency of arms supplies for the strengthening of non-proliferation regimes and of overall stability and predictability, is actively participating in the work of the relevant ad hoc committee and is contributing, or trying to contribute to the search for the necessary arrangements.

In this connection, I would like to dwell in the problem of export control, and on an aspect of that control of which we have unfortunately yet to hear in this forum. I am referring to the activities of the Coordinating Committee, otherwise known as CoCom, and, to be more precise, to its discriminatory practices with regard to Russia. As it is well known, fundamental changes have taken place in the international arena and the "cold war" is now a thing of the past. It might be thought that its ugly attributes should also have vanished without trace, but that has not happened and CoCom continues to try to impose on Russia its discredited rules of the game. The position of the Russian Federation on this issue is clear: CoCom's discriminatory policy and practices must be ended. That would be in keeping with the way things are today. But if this institution is to be retained, would it not be better to transform it into an instrument of constructive cooperation for non-proliferation purposes?

We are prepared to contribute towards that, including through practical steps taken by ourselves, for example the introduction in Russia of an effective system of export controls harmonized with existing international regimes in this field. I would like to inform you that we are now seriously examining the possibility of participating in the MTCR. In the circumstances we justifiably expect that the discriminatory measures impeding Russia's access to the world market of space services will be lifted.

The confrontation in such matters along North/South lines must also be overcome. That will, of course, require complementary efforts both from States supplying, and from States receiving high technology, including from their representatives to the Conference on Disarmament when we consider, for example, the problem of increasing transparency in the field of technology transfer.

Fourth, the Russian Federation, reaffirming its assessment of the Chemical Weapons Convention as a landmark in the process of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, considers the speedy entry into force of this Convention to be an important guarantee of non-proliferation of these weapons. We will continue our cooperation with other interested States within the framework of the preparatory committee in The Hague. We must also direct our joint efforts towards making the Convention universal.

Fifth, Russia is, naturally, keeping in mind the problem of strengthening the regime of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. We welcome the convening in 1994 of a special conference of the States parties to the Convention that would take a decision on further steps to strengthen its

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verification machinery. We consider as useful the preparation by the ad hoc group of governmental experts from States parties during its meeting in September of a consensus report containing recommendations on potential verification measures.

That is the programme of action that we are proposing and those are our thoughts concerning the non-proliferation problem. They could, as we see it, become a basis for further successful international cooperation, including cooperation within our forum. It would be extremely useful for us to hear the opinions of other participants in the Conference as well.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I wish to thank Mr. Valery Zemskov, representative of the Russian Federation, for his statement on non-proliferation and also for the kind words he addressed to me as President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

That concludes our work for today. Before I adjourn this plenary meeting I wish to welcome Dr. Mahmoud Karim, my colleague, with whom we worked in the past in the Conference on Disarmament. He has joined the Egyptian delegation during its presidency of the Conference. I wish to welcome Dr. Karim, who is now Director of Disarmament Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cairo.

I would like to recall that, as announced earlier, immediately after this meeting the Conference will hold informal open-ended consultations on its improved and effective functioning under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmed Kamal, representative of Pakistan. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 19 August, at 10 a.m. and I would also like to take this opportunity to remind you that after Thursday's plenary the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency will hold an informal meeting to consider its report. The meeting stands adjourned

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.662
19 August 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
Thursday, 19 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Mounir Zahran (Egypt)

GE.93-62156 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 662nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before I proceed with our business for today I would like to bid farewell to one of the members of the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament who has been working with competence and dedication since he first came to the secretariat of the Conference in 1982. I refer to Mr. Michael Cassandra, who discharged his responsibilities in full as secretary of the Ad Hoc Committees on a Nuclear Test Ban and on Radiological Weapons, as well as of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. He has also helped me personally during the 1992 session when I, as Special Coordinator on the question of transparency in armaments, was carrying out enlarged and informal consultations on behalf of the Conference. He is now joining the Office for Disarmament Affairs at United Nations headquarters in New York and I believe that he can leave us with the feeling of having carried out his responsibilities and of having done a difficult job with competence and utmost dedication. On behalf of the Conference, I wish him and his family every success and personal happiness.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Ukraine and Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, the chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, who will introduce his reports on those consultations. We also have the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, who will introduce the progress report of that subsidiary body.

Mr. SLIPCHENCKO (Ukraine): Mr. President, in congratulating you on the assumption of the presidency of this distinguished forum, I would like to stress that there have been few periods in the history of the Conference on Disarmament when the significance of this post was greater than it is now, with the Conference nearing the end of its 1993 session. There are good reasons to believe that in the course of this concluding part the Conference under your presidency will secure and develop positive results attained at an earlier stage under the guidance of your highly esteemed predecessors. I wish you and all participants in the Conference every success in these endeavours, to which my delegation is ready to contribute in a constructive way.

Assessing the achievements of the current session, we should undoubtedly refer first of all to the adoption by the Conference of the landmark decision giving its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable document. It is perfectly clear at this moment that the road leading to the eventual conclusion of a CTBT will be an arduous one, but it is equally evident that by having embarked upon it the Conference has reaffirmed its unique status as the most authoritative negotiating body on disarmament and international security.

This brings the Conference at least one step closer to the fulfilment of its ultimate mandate, which is to be reaffirmed as universal and complete disarmament. However distant and even elusive this goal might seem, it will never lose its moral allure of an historic challenge confronted by humanity. It is within this conceptual framework that we regard a CTBT as an extremely

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important instrument of the reinforcement of the international regime of non-proliferation and thus of raising the level of stability in the development of the entire system of international relations. I would say in this connection that the role of the Conference should not be perceived as the one of the guardian at the doors of the nuclear club. It should be always aware of its general mandate, which is reflected in the very name of the Conference on Disarmament.

Sincere desire to further this cause constitutes the core of Ukraine's approach to disarmament and international security issues. In view of the frequent attempts to misrepresent our position, which have noticeably intensified of late and have been voiced even in this forum in the most inappropriate manner, I can state with the utmost clarity that my country confirms its commitment to acquire a non-nuclear status and fulfil its international obligations. This has been declared more than once and on many occasions at the highest level of my country's political leadership. The Guidelines of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine recently adopted by the Ukrainian parliament contain a special clause stipulating Ukraine's rejection of the very possibility of use of nuclear weapons alongside its advocacy of nuclear disarmament. I quote: "Having become by virtue of historic circumstances the owner of nuclear weapons inherited from the former USSR, Ukraine will never sanction their use and strikes the threat of use of nuclear weapons from the arsenal of its foreign policy". The text of the Guidelines is being distributed by the secretariat at our request, together with the text of my statement.

The seriousness of our intentions has been already proved by the fact that, having voluntarily announced its intention to become a non-nuclear State, Ukraine has taken a series of practical steps in this direction. Ukraine agreed to place nuclear weapons situated on its territory, pending their destruction, under the operational control of the Joint Command of the CIS Strategic Forces, on condition that it kept control over the non-use of these weapons. Ukraine removed ahead of schedule all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory for the purpose of their dismantling and subsequent liquidation. Ukraine consented to place under IAEA control all relevant objects on its territory even prior to Ukraine's accession to the NPT. It was Ukraine which put forward at the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus as early as in April 1992 a proposal to sign an international document which would became a basis for the equal participation of these States in START; the Lisbon Protocol emerged as a result of this process.

Nobody can accuse us of not participating in all negotiations aimed at bringing about tangible results. Neither should anyone neglect the fact that Ukraine has effectively neutralized eventual use of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, which is now situated on its territory. Taking into consideration volatile developments in a number of neighbouring countries, including that in possession of nuclear arms, it can be scarcely presumed that immediate transfer of the nuclear missiles from Ukraine elsewhere would by itself diminish nuclear risks and enhance non-proliferation.

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Respecting international obligations voluntarily assumed by our country and being convinced that they conform to its highest national interests, the President of Ukraine submitted to the parliament a proposal concerning ratification of the above-mentioned Treaty and Ukraine's accession to the NPT. Thus the legislative process has been started and it has been developing so far according to the procedures common to the majority of other parliamentarian bodies. It can be recalled that the process of ratification of START 1 in the United States Senate, for instance, lasted about a year. Also American experts negotiated it over the course of nine years. The level of the expertise of the parliamentarians should be also taken into account.

One could hardly expect from Ukraine adoption of "rubber-stamp" decisions on the matters related to the most sensitive aspects of its national security, especially in the contemporary geo-political context when our very territorial integrity is being repeatedly called in question by the legislature of the neighbouring State. But even in cases when our borders are officially recognized, it is always conditioned by the continuing membership of Ukraine in the CIS. Mutual confidence is further undermined by such arbitrary decisions of Russia as liquidation of the Joint Command of CIS Strategic Forces established by the common decision of the heads of State of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This action constitutes an overt violation of the Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces, invalidating the agreement per se. It is exactly this Agreement that the representative of the Russian Federation alluded to in his presentation on 5 August 1993, however, having omitted essential details.

He also failed to mention another unilateral decision made by the Russian Minister of Defence. In February this year it abolished the units which were responsible for storage and maintenance of nuclear warheads located in the territory of Ukraine. Russian authorities have already been deliberately refusing for one year and a half to provide these units with components and spare parts which are to be periodically replaced in order to ensure safety of nuclear warheads. Under these circumstances, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine was virtually left with no choice but to incorporate two of these units into the Forty-Third Army of the CIS Strategic Forces in order to guarantee the safety of the process of dismantling nuclear warheads. Another lapse of memory on the part of my Russian colleagues comes to no surprise that it obversely contradicts his bill of indictment presented here on 5 August and on some other occasions.

The present scarcity of material and financial resources constitutes another crucial factor undermining the pace of Ukraine's movement towards acquiring non-nuclear status. It should be recognized that Ukraine is unable to carry out destruction of nuclear weapons on its own because this will put on it a burden estimated at approximately US$ 3 billion - far too great for a transitional economy to bear, adversely affecting the process of reform, aggravating the current economic crisis and the hardships of the population, and substantially limiting possibilities for dealing with the aftermath of Chernobyl disaster. The latter accounts for a third of the Ukrainian national budget.

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Ukraine's position essentially differs from that of other countries which are yet to join the NPT because it has to deal with the nuclear weapons already stationed in it. Having been denied the opportunity to take part in shaping the policies concerning production and deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil at the time, Ukraine and its people are presently facing a situation when they have to fulfil international obligations in accordance with a treaty which was also negotiated without their participation. At the same time, implementation of this treaty corresponds to the national interest of all nuclear States and the international community at large. We consider these reasons grave enough to justify, de facto and de jure, Ukraine's request for resources for the purposes of the implementation of START I being addressed first of all to the most interested nations. Their contribution to the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine could be made in the form of economic, financial and technical assistance. We are grateful to the United States Government for its readiness to provide $175 million for these purposes, although this sum definitely and unfortunately falls too short of the real needs. The international fund for nuclear disarmament of which we have proposed the creation could play an instrumental role in mobilizing international support for this noble cause.

Not waiting foreign assistance, Ukraine has already engaged in preparatory work aimed at implementation of START I and the Lisbon Protocol. To be more precise, my country is ready to negotiate with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus the issue of distribution of the limits and restrictions concerning strategic offensive weapons established for the former USSR by virtue of the Lisbon Protocol. Recurring attempts by Russia to reach an agreement on this issue on a bilateral basis are being regarded by Ukraine as unacceptable because they contradict the principle of equality of obligations under the Lisbon Protocol.

Ukraine has also taken preliminary steps in preparation for its accession to the NPT. In september 1992, supporting IAEA activities for providing comprehensive safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, in his letter addressed to the Director-General of IAEA, informed him of Ukraine's readiness to apply corresponding guarantees to all nuclear installations on the territory of Ukraine.

Ukraine's accession to the NPT calls for measures in order to create a national system of accounting and control over nuclear materials and to ensure their physical protection, the training of personnel and the establishment of an inventory of nuclear facilities. We will need time and appropriate assistance to achieve these goals.

In a more general sense, Ukraine considers its accession to the NPT to go far beyond a mere political declaration, striving to ensure that the Treaty's coming into force is accompanied by the resolution of all issues related to the elimination of nuclear weapons on its territory. My country has previously agreed to place nuclear weapons currently in Ukraine under the Joint Command of the CIS Strategic Forces, but we have never recognized them to be the property of any other State, Russia included. Neither are we going to do that in future.

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Having no intention to acquire control over the use of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices - in conformity with article II of NPT - Ukraine, however, has every legitimate right of ownership to all the property of the former USSR on its territory. This includes the property of the armed forces and their strategic nuclear forces branch and all physical components of nuclear warheads, including both strategic warheads still deployed on Ukrainian territory and tactical warheads removed to Russia in spring 1992 for dismantling and elimination. This right of ownership extends to the repossession of all nuclear substances extracted from the dismantled warheads situated on Ukrainian territory on conditions which will preclude their further use for the creation of nuclear weapons but will enable, on the other hand, their utilization for peaceful purposes. In view of the shortage of fuel available for Ukrainian nuclear power stations and persistent difficulties in ensuring a sufficient energy supply, Ukraine cannot afford to neglect several billion United States dollars' worth of resources contained in nuclear warheads. So my country's determination to exercise its right of ownership in relation to physical components of the nuclear warheads on its territory is motivated primarily by dire necessities of the Ukraine economy, which is going through an extremely painful transformation period.

Ukraine's approach to this problem not only follows the line of its internal legislation, but also rests upon the solid foundation of the generally accepted norms of international law codified in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States of 1983. My country has consistently demonstrated political will to work out legal formulae and technical arrangements acceptable to all parties involved. According to the latest information, a corresponding Ukrainian-Russian agreement envisaging reprocessing at Russian enterprises of the nuclear fuel from the missiles situated on Ukrainian soil is well on its way.

Regrettably, the conclusion of the cold-war chapter of human civilization still has not made the world a safe place to live. Adherence to forceful methods of international conduct has turned out to be tenacious. Being fully aware of the complexities of the modern international political scene and the existing dangers to its independence, Ukraine, like many other States, is looking for the most efficient ways to ensure its national security. In voluntarily relinquishing nuclear weapons, the so-far most potent deterrent, Ukraine can expect to obtain reliable guarantees of its security. This problem has been the subject of intensive consultations with the United States since April 1992, followed by those with the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China.

Unilateral declarations of an exclusively political nature are, however, regarded by my country as inadequate. It rather seeks truly international guarantees which should be provided in the form of a multilateral, legally-binding agreement to which Ukraine and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will be the parties. According to the draft agreement elaborated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the permanent members of the Security Council would assume an obligation to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukrainian borders and to refrain from the use of force or the threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. In

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addition to that, the agreement might incorporate an obligation on the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from the use of their armed forces against Ukraine with the exception of cases of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. In our view, this document should also include a special provision envisaging the mechanism of extraordinary consultations among the parties to the agreement when the national security of Ukraine is endangered.

Willingness to reach an agreement on the international guarantees attests exclusively to the genuine desire of my country to resolve the issues pertaining to the nuclear weapons in Ukraine in a good spirit and without unnecessary delay. In the same spirit we support the efforts being made within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and its corresponding ad hoc committee to design effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear States against the peril of nuclear weapons. We are ready to work efficiently towards achieving this goal and we hope that the above-said guarantee agreement could be an important contribution to the negotiating process on this issue.

We are equally committed to being an active part of the multilateral effort to negotiate a CTBT, which has entered a practical phase, and to looking for new approaches in order to ensure progressive development on other issues and the efficient functioning of the Conference itself. Recent proposals tabled at this forum by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador O'Sullivan, could provide Ukraine and other countries with new opportunities in this respect. I hope that the Conference will not fail to submit to the General Assembly a consensus decision on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of Ukraine, Ambassador Slipchenko, for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the Chair.

On my list of speakers we have next Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan, the chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. Ambassador Kamal will introduce his report on those consultations. This is the report that has been circulated to you in document CD/WP.446.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan), I take the floor to present the report on the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament circulated as document CD/WP.446.

Since its initiation in 1990, the exercise of consultations on improved and effective functioning has progressed well and made some significant contributions. During the current year also, as in previous years, lively and constructive debate has taken place on the various issues identified for consideration.

I am happy to report that agreement has emerged in important areas: on guidelines for drafting the reports of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies; on the maintenance of the present system of the rotation of the presidency and its current four-week tenure; on the continuation of the

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present practice in which the incumbent President associates the outgoing as well as the in-coming Presidents in all consultations, including the Wednesday presidential consultations; on a continued adherence to the rule of consensus in the Conference; on the computerization of Conference documents, with a view to eschewing duplication and cutting down on the avoidable expenditure by making use of the existing optical disk system facility in coordination with the United Nations Disarmament Affairs Information System.

Our common exercise has once again proved its utility by making tangible recommendations. The desire of members to continue these recommended consultations and to keep the improved and effective functioning of the Conference constantly under review shows the importance attached to this exercise. I commend the report for adoption.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Kamal for his statement concerning his report on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. In conformity with the practice of the Conference, I intend to invite the Conference to take note of that report, and that at a later stage of our work.

I now give the floor to Mr. Dalman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, who will introduce his progress report on the work of the Ad Hoc Group. This report has been circulated in document CD/1211.

Mr. DALMAN (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): I am pleased to report today on the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group, held from 26 July to 6 August 1993, and to introduce the Group's progress report, which is contained in document CD/1211.

The session was attended by experts and representatives from 29 countries. The broad participation in the group, with translation into all United Nations languages and an increased amount of working documents, put an increased burden on the secretariat. The Group appreciates the efforts by all concerned to cope with this situation.

Mr. President, let me at this time join in the words of appreciation that you expressed to Mr. Michael Cassandra, who is leaving Geneva today, for the outstanding contribution he has made over the years to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

Before commenting on the progress report, it might be appropriate at this moment to briefly summarize the GSE activities. The Group of Scientific Experts was established by the CCD in 1976 to consider international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events. Through its initial work, the Ad Hoc Group established the basic principles and the general structure for the international exchange of seismological data for monitoring purposes. The guiding principles and the general structure have remained essentially unchanged despite the almost revolutionary technical development of the system that has taken place.

The system has consisted since its beginning of a global network of seismological stations connected through national data centres to an

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international data centre. The system has been looked upon as a service facility for participating countries by providing easily accessible data collected on a global scale for national assessment. The system and its International Data Centre are not supposed to make any final assessments as to the nature of the event, that is, to distinguish between earthquakes or explosions.

In the early days the system was based on the exchange of parameter data obtained through the analysis of regional recordings at national data centres. These parameter data contained the information to allow the detection and location of the event by the International Data Centre. The reporting also contained a so-called identification parameter, describing, for example, the shape or the frequency content of the signals, to assist participating countries in the interpretation or identification of events. A lot of work was done at that time to develop and test suitable such identification parameters. This limited reporting constrained to parameter data only, which corresponded to about one written page per day, was partly due to the limited technical data transmission capabilities of those days. The main reason was, however, the political concern at the time about exchanging large volumes of original recordings.

The political climate has changed and the constraints have been lifted. Over the years the system has gradually been developed through research efforts, through the installation of new technical facilities in individual countries and through efforts within the Group to modernize the system so as fully to utilize the scientific and technological developments. The experimental system now being proposed by the Group thus differs considerably from the original system, not only in technical design, but also in capability.

The new system which was presented to the Conference on Disarmament following the Group's meeting in February this year is based on the on-line transmission of data from a global network of high-quality stations to an advanced International Data Centre. The system is designed to meet far-reaching technical and operational requirements. Most of these stations are array stations, where many sensors are emplaced to form an antenna to improve signal detection. This primary, or Alpha network is supplemented by a larger number of stations, referred to as the Beta network, from which data is retrieved by the International Data Centre as required. Individual countries may contribute additional data, called gamma data, as they see fit in order to facilitate the analysis of an event.

The system is thus now based on the on-line exchange of complete recordings, which means that all information is available to all participants. This has made the exchange of special identification parameters, which was a most essential element in earlier versions of the system, unnecessary, as such parameters can be calculated from the original data in a manner that suits the actual need by the individual countries receiving this data.

The Group has, during its session, elaborated functional requirements for the components of this new International Seismic Monitoring System. These elaborations have been based on material provided by a number of working

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groups. Several of these working groups have thereby finalized their work. An annex attached to the progress report summarizes these elaborations. This annex presents the objectives and the overall concept of the system, which I have already briefly outlined. It further contains the technical specifications for the stations to be used and for the International Data Centre. Based on the experience from previous tests and on results of computer simulation, the GSE now proposes a specific network of 52 Alpha stations to be used in the forthcoming experiment, which we refer to as GSETT-3. GSETT-3 thus differs substantially from previous large-scale tests as the Group now proposes a specific network. This experimental network has an estimated detection threshold of about magnitude 3.5 in most parts of the globe, somewhat lower on the continents. To achieve a detection threshold on magnitude 3.5 and even somewhat better in most parts of the world is the most significant improvement of today's capability. GSETT-2, which utilized data from available stations and which did not attempt to create an optimized network, provided a detection capability of magnitude 4.5 or less. This means that the experimental network now proposed is estimated to have a detection capability at least 10 times that obtained during GSETT-2.

Annex 1 contains a tentative distribution of the Alpha stations, containing 27 array and 25 three-component stations, based to the extent possible on existing facilities. This distribution may be somewhat modified during the further planning of the experiment. Those countries which have stations that will form part of the experimental network are urged to make formal commitments to contribute these facilities to GSETT-3.

The Group has established a tentative plan and schedule for the implementation and testing of the experimental system. The intention is to start the full-scale testing on a global scale by 1 January 1995. Work is already under way, not only to define the system and the functional requirements of its components, but also to develop the experimental International Data Centre in the United States.

The Ad Hoc Group has established three working groups with great responsibilities to handle GSETT-3: one for planning, one for operation and one for evaluation. As GSETT-3 is to be a major undertaking by the Group, the overall coordination will be conducted by the Chairman and the Scientific Secretary. The Group is paying special attention to a continuing evaluation of the test to be able to provide the Conference on Disarmament and the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with experience and results as GSETT-3 evolves.

The Group considered during its session the cost of establishing and operating seismological systems and focused on the experimental system to be utilized during GSETT-3. In my presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 5 August, I discussed the issue of cost estimates at some length and I will today only briefly summarize the Group's present analysis, which is annexed to the progress report.

The Group stresses that careful analysis is required to make cost estimates with reasonable accuracy. Such an analysis must be based on fairly detailed knowledge, not only of the geographical extent of the system but also

(Mr. Dalman, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

of the operational requirements such as reliability, security and redundancy. Estimates of investment cost for stations in virgin areas are quite uncertain, as the main part of the cost usually is not instrument or equipment cost but rather construction cost or cost of necessary infrastructure, which may be quite difficult to estimate without careful site surveying. The running costs for a given facility could vary considerably from one country to another depending on labour cost and also on administrative regulations, which, for example, makes transmission cost, which is a significant running cost, several times higher in one country than in another. The administrative overhead, which depends on the organizational framework of the system, could also be a most significant part of the overall cost. The Group has made estimates of the investment and running cost of the experimental network to be used in GSETT-3. As this network is based to a large extent on existing facilities, these estimates should be fairly accurate. The experimental network proposed makes maximum use of early investments estimated to be about 150 million United States dollars. New investments needed to bring the system up to the desired station distribution and technical quality are estimated at 20 million dollars. This includes 3 million dollars of new investment in the prototype IDC now being established in the United States. The total running cost of the entire system is estimated at 25-30 million dollars per year. The Group has not discussed how these costs should be covered.

The Group received during its session briefings from individual delegations on activities of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, especially on its hearings on non-seismic verification techniques. These presentations were much appreciated, and I hope this dialogue between the Committee and the Ad Hoc Group will be developed. To this end, the Group decided to invite the Chairman of the Committee to its next session to present issues dealt with by the Committee that are relevant to the work of the Ad Hoc Group.

The Group received and discussed proposals for work on seismic event identification methods and non-seismological monitoring techniques and a proposal for the expansion of the mandate of the Group to include also considerations of non-seismological methods. No consensus was reached on these proposals. It was, however, agreed that I should undertake informal consultations on these issues and report the result at the next session of the Group.

Informal technical meetings held between the Group's formal sessions have over the year contributed significantly to the progress of the Group. The Group noted with appreciation that two such technical meetings had been convened since the Group's previous session. One meeting, hosted by Italy in Rome from 1 to 3 March 1993, was focused on seismological procedures. The other meeting, hosted by the United States in Landsdowne, Virginia, from 29 June to 2 July 1993, considered issues related to the planning of GSETT-3. Many participants in the Group attended and contributed to these two meetings. As to the continued contacts with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Group appreciated the offer of Dr. Duma of Austria to act as a contact person to maintain informal contacts with IAEA. The Group had earlier similar arrangements with the World Meterological Organization.

(Mr. Dalman, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

The Group considers that the establishment and testing of the proposed experimental system which we refer to as GSETT-3 is a logical next undertaking. GSETT-3 will provide valuable information and experiences that continuously could be made available to the Conference on Disarmament and to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The experimental system will also provide an infrastructure that might prove valuable in the establishment of the ultimate verification system.

The Ad Hoc Group has been serving the Conference on Disarmament for 17 years. When the CD now is focusing its efforts on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Group is ready to continue serving the Conference to the best of its ability and to carry out the tasks entrusted to it. To that end, the Group suggests that its next session be convened from 7 to 18 February 1994 in Geneva or at the date that is most responsive to the needs of the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, the Ad Hoc Group recognizes that, depending on the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, it may become necessary to meet more frequently than in the past.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Mr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, for the presentation he has given us of this valuable progress report. You will notice that the progress report contains in its paragraph 13, a suggestion to the effect that the next session of the Group be convened in Geneva from 7 to 18 February 1994, that is next year, or at a date that is most responsive to the needs of the Conference on Disarmament. This suggestion, of course, relates to the recent decision of the Conference to give to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is in that light that we should understand the last sentence of paragraph 13 [illegible] which the Ad Hoc Group recognizes that, depending on the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, it may be necessary for this Group to meet more frequently than has been the case so far and in the past. However, for the moment we should consider the dates recommended by the Ad Hoc Group, keeping in mind the possibility of adjusting these dates depending on the arrangements of the Conference. And therefore at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 26 August, I will put to you a recommendation concerning the dates for the next session of the Group, with the proviso that those dates might be adjusted in order to respond to the needs of the activities of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. ZEMSKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, I wanted to associate myself with your words of gratitude concerning the presentation of the report just made by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Dahlman, and to thank the Group of Scientific Experts for the very productive work which it has done to date.

I am also obliged to refer to the statement made by the distinguished representative of Ukraine. First of all, I want to thank him for his statement, which, in the part dealing with Ukrainian-Russian relations, not only confirmed, but furnished additional justification for the deep concern that the Russian Federation feels with respect to the negative aspect of the Ukrainian leadership's present policy both as regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and as regards nuclear stability in the

(Mr. Zemskov, Russian Federation)

world in general. I also would like to inform you that we have requested the authorities of the Conference on Disarmament to distribute as an official document the statement of the Government of the Russian Federation regarding the most recent developments of the nuclear policy of Ukraine.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, in connection with your statement on Mr. Michael Cassandra, who will soon leave us, I asked for the floor to register my deep appreciation as the Chairman of the NTB Committee of the work done by him during his tenure of office here, especially of the cooperation he rendered to me as Secretary of the Committee. Without his experience and efficient assistance we would not have been able to achieve the progress we have made so far. I wanted to retain him as Committee Secretary as long as I could, but since he will be promoted to a higher post in New York, I wish to congratulate him for the success in his career and express once again my sincere thanks to him.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Tanaka of Japan for the statement in which he expressed his thanks and appreciation for Mr. Michael Cassandra. At the beginning of the meeting I also expressed my appreciation to Mr. Cassandra for all the assistance he rendered to me last year within the framework of the informal consultations carried out by the Conference when I was acting as Special Coordinator for the Conference on Disarmament on the question of transparency in armaments. I would like to repeat once more my full appreciation for his efforts.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? This does not seem to be the case.

The secretariat has distributed today the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week, that is, from 23 August. It is hoped that the reports of the subsidiary bodies will be adopted as far as possible on Monday, 23 August. I hope to have the cooperation of all members to achieve that deadline. If this turns out not to be possible because of exceptional circumstances, which we all hope will not be the case, we may still have time left for two meetings on Tuesday, 24 August. I would recommend that we do not consider Wednesday as a possibility, since we will otherwise impose on the technical services of the Conference the impossible task of processing all parts of the annual report to be presented by the CD to the General Assembly simultaneously.

For your information, the technical parts of the draft annual report will be circulated in the official languages beginning from Monday morning, 23 August, until Tuesday morning, 24 August, in time for consideration at the informal meeting on Thursday, 26 August.

(The PRESIDENT)

Of course, in the light of the stage reached in our work at the Conference, the timetable which has been circulated is merely indicative and it may be changed if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): That concludes our work for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 August, at 10 a.m. sharp. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.663
26 August 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 26 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Mounir Zahran (Egypt)

GE.93-62346 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 663rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to welcome warmly, on behalf of the Conference and in my own personal capacity, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, His Excellency Paul Lever, who will be the first speaker at this plenary meeting, and who is visiting us in the CD for the first time. The British Assistant Under-Secretary of State is the person responsible for disarmament affairs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He took up his present post last year. I am certain that all the members of the CD will follow his statement with keen interest.

I wish to inform you that, as announced at the previous plenary meeting, I intend to propose to the Conference that it should consider taking action at the end of the meeting on the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as well as the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which has been circulated as document CD/WP.446.

As agreed last week, the Conference will hold today, immediately following the plenary meeting, an informal meeting devoted to consideration of the technical parts of the draft annual report on the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/WP.445).

I have on my list of speakers for today the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, as I stated earlier, as well as the representatives of Indonesia and the Czech Republic, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, the representatives of Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America, and the Special Coordinator on the question of the expansion of the Conference's membership. I now give the floor to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, His Excellency, Paul Lever, CMG.

Mr. LEVER (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words of welcome. As you have said, although much of my own professional career has been spent dealing with security, defence and arms control issues, this is the first opportunity I have had to take part myself directly in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I am delighted to be able to do so. This body and its predecessors have a distinguished history. It is due to them that we have the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the biological weapons Convention, and, most recently, the chemical weapons Convention. These are three key treaties in the field of arms control and disarmament. They show that a body of this kind can indeed, when it applies itself to real issues, achieve real negotiating results; and that there is more to arms control at the global level than just the passage of endless United Nations resolutions.

(Mr. Lever, United Kingdom)

For my own country, the establishment, maintenance and improvement of all three of these regimes is central to our security. The United Kingdom continues to give unstinting support to the preparations for the entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention, and to the work of the verification experts in relation to the biological weapons Convention. But the gravest of all the threats we consider we face is the threat of nuclear proliferation. I therefore make no apology for concentrating today on the non-proliferation Treaty and the reasons why we believe it should be extended indefinitely in 1995.

We recognize, of course, that the NPT has not yet fulfilled all the hopes of its creators. Among the parties to the Treaty four main types of criticism are sometimes heard: that the Treaty still has not attracted universal support; that it has suffered from compliance problems; that it has not done enough to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; that not enough has been done to make progress towards its aspirations for nuclear and general disarmament. As we approach 1995, it is important to face up to these criticisms. But it is important also to remember the enormous amount that has been achieved by almost a generation of patient and constructive diplomacy.

Let me turn to the question of universality first. The NPT is the most widely supported arms control treaty there has ever been. One hundred and sixty States are now party to it. And it continues to gain new adherents - the most recent being the welcome accession of Belarus. Moreover, because the Treaty has established an international norm against nuclear proliferation, its influence extends even beyond its parties. We welcome, for example, the recent moves by Argentina, Brazil and other Latin American countries to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force. We hope this will eventually lead to all Latin American countries becoming parties to the NPT itself.

The fact is that before the NPT was negotiated there were widespread expectations that by now there would be some 20 or so nuclear-weapon States. This has not happened, and that is a measure of the NPT's success. Of course, there are important absentees. The refusal of India, Pakistan, Israel and others to accede, and the question mark over the willingness of Ukraine to do so, is a source of weakness. It is sometimes argued by representatives of these countries that until the security situation of their particular region of the world improves, they do not feel able to renounce the option of acquiring nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly the political problems in the Middle East and South Asia are acute and deep-rooted; and we recognize that the break-up of the former Soviet Union has created new uncertainties in that region. Solutions can only be found through regional negotiations, supported as necessary by the international community. But, as part of that process, it is reasonable to ask whether the nuclear option, which some of the States concerned seek to retain, genuinely enhances their security, or whether it aggravates the problem and threatens the stability which they wish to achieve.

As for compliance problems, the scale of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme has been a salutary shock for all of us. But the international community has responded to that shock. Under the terms of the cease-fire resolution, Security Council resolution 687, work is in hand to

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eliminate all Iraq's significant nuclear, biological, chemical and missile capabilities, and to place their remaining activities under a strict long-term monitoring regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also adopted a wide range of additional measures which should help deter any similar breaches of Treaty obligations in future.

North Korea also presented us with a challenge when it announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT after refusing to accept inspections requested by the International Atomic Energy Agency. But once again the international community has responded and has made clear its determination that Treaty commitments should be respected. We have welcomed the subsequent announcement that North Korea has suspended its intended withdrawal. And we hope that further dialogue with IAEA, South Korea and with the United States will soon lead to North Korea complying fully with its safeguards agreement and permanently reaffirming its commitment to the NPT.

These compliance problems are of course very serious matters. We do not underestimate them. If we cannot ensure compliance, faith in the NPT risks being eroded. It is therefore vital that the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency should continue their invaluable work in Iraq. We also continue to support the Agency in relation to North Korea and in strengthening the safeguards system as a whole. We must ensure too that the Agency continues to receive all the support it requires for its work from the United Nations Security Council. The Presidential statement after the Security Council summit in January 1992 was an important step in this respect. But we should not despair of the NPT because of these compliance problems. The large mass of parties are fulfilling their obligations in good faith. The international community is taking firm action both to deal with the compliance problems that do exist and to lessen the prospects of similar problems occurring again. This is only possible because of the NPT and the framework it provides for pursuing these matters. The answer to the problems of compliance is not to decry the utility of the NPT; it is to strengthen its monitoring and verification regime, and to support the work of IAEA in implementing it.

A third type of criticism of the NPT is that it has not done enough to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is of course undeniable that the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has not proved to be the panacea which some believed, in the 1960s, that it might be. But it is hardly fair to place the blame for this at the door of the Treaty. It reflects a reappraisal of the economic case for nuclear power. What the Treaty, and associated Agency safeguards, has done is to provide the framework of reassurance which is essential to the international trade in nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes. Without this framework international cooperation in this area would be far more difficult than it is today. Indeed it is hard to see how it would exist at all. Nor do the safeguards required by the Treaty in any way hamper the legitimate use of nuclear energy. The example of many highly industrialized countries demonstrate that safeguards do not stand in the way of thriving nuclear power programmes. Nor are they expensive; on the contrary, they are a very small price to pay for the reassurance they provide.

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The fourth criticism of the Treaty by some of its adherents is that there has been inadequate progress towards the NPT's aspirations for nuclear and general disarmament; and, in particular, that the nuclear Powers have been tardy in implementing their obligations under article VI of the Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

The truth, surely, is that it was the NPT which created the political framework for all the arms control efforts of the last 25 years, particularly the nuclear arms control efforts. It was no accident, for example, that the United States and the then Soviet Union announced their intention to begin bilateral talks about their nuclear weaponry on the very day the NPT was opened for signature. Despite many alarms and excursions in their wider relationship, they persisted with such talks over many years. And now, at last, we are witnessing the fruits of those efforts and of the cold war's end.

By comparison with the situation which applied in 1968 when the NPT was signed, the changes in the nuclear balance in recent years have been truly astonishing. The 1987 INF Treaty brought about the elimination of a whole category of United States and former Soviet nuclear weapons. The START I and START II treaties, once in force, will mean the disappearance of a further entire category of American and Russian strategic systems, namely MIRVed land-based missiles, and the reduction of the stockpiles of these two countries to 3,000 warheads each, a fraction of what they were in recent years. Can it really be argued that this is not substantial progress? Or that it would have been possible without the NPT itself?

The United Kingdom, for its part, has always maintained only the minimum strategic nuclear deterrent required for our security needs. We did not depart from that policy at the height of the cold war, and we shall not depart from it now. We have however adjusted the level of our deterrent to reflect the improvements in the international security environment. We have withdrawn from service all our maritime nuclear weapons, and we are halving the number of our air-delivered weapons. And of course we have for many years offered firm assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States about the circumstances in which we will not use our nuclear weapons. We remain committed to these assurances.

In addition to concrete achievement in the field of nuclear arms control there is also the prospect of the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. The preamble of the NPT recalled the determination expressed by the parties to the limited test-ban treaty to seek an end to all nuclear tests. Momentum is now gathering towards the realization of this goal, a process in which the United Kingdom is ready to play a full and constructive part. We welcome the recent decision to give the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a new mandate in preparation for these negotiations. We hope that the membership of the Conference on Disarmament can be expanded before substantive negotiations begin in the New Year. A carefully negotiated comprehensive test-ban treaty, to which all CD members are parties, will reinforce efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We look forward to adding such a treaty to the list of achievements of the Conference

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on Disarmament itself. But our commitment to work constructively for a comprehensive test-ban treaty reflects our assumption that the non-proliferation Treaty will remain in force as well.

I have mentioned some of the criticisms made of the NPT by its adherents. But it would be wrong perhaps, not to mention one that is made by some of the countries who decided not to accede to it: namely that the Treaty was fundamentally discriminatory since it established a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear States, the haves and the have-nots.

Indeed it did. But for the objective reasons. Nuclear weapons have been invented; they had been used; and they had come to play a crucial role in the uneasy East-West security balance during the time of the cold war. My own Government is unapologetic about the part Britain itself played in these events. In the circumstances of the Second World War we were right, we believe, to encourage British scientists to play their important role in helping invent the atom bomb. In the circumstances of the cold war we were right, we believe, to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons of our own and not to rely purely on conventional military capabilities for our security.

But the cold war was a unique phenomenon. The security situation in other parts of the world was not in the past, and is not now, clouded by the same pervasive threat of ideological confrontation and political division. The acknowledgement in the non-proliferation Treaty of the reality of the five existing nuclear Powers can indeed be called discriminatory. But these Powers were at that time central players in a security relationship of extreme fragility and potentially disastrous consequences if mistakes were made. Not necessarily a condition to be envied by the rest of the world.

But the cold war is over. The question which I suggest can reasonably be asked of the nuclear Powers today should not be based on a perception of discrimination as a result of history, but on their current policies. For example: are the nuclear Powers adjusting their concept of deterrence and their reliance on nuclear weapons to reflect the improved security environment? In the case of the United Kingdom, we believe we are. Are the nuclear Powers exercising responsible stewardship of their nuclear stockpiles during the period of adjustment to new conditions? Again, in the case of the United Kingdom, we believe we are. Are the nuclear Powers exploiting the fact that their possession of nuclear weapons to the detriment of the security of non-nuclear States? In the case of the United Kingdom, we do not believe that this is so.

The conclusions therefore that the United Kingdom draws for the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty are the following. We will continue to work for universal, or as near universal as possible, adherence to it. Where compliance problems exist, they can most readily be resolved by working to strengthen the Treaty rather than by despairing of it. The Treaty creates an indispensable framework of reassurance for the widespread use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Treaty has also provided a framework for

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startlingly successful recent results in the fields of nuclear arms control disarmament. Without a durable non-proliferation Treaty it is questionable whether these results could be sustained.

We believe therefore that the non-proliferation Treaty continues to reflect the common interest of all of us. Its value and its credibility are higher now than when it was signed in 1968. Future events are unlikely to diminish its importance. We hope therefore that in 1995 it can be extended indefinitely.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom for his important statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): Mr. President, speaking toward the end of our 1993 session, my delegation would just like to briefly address some issues which have been subject to growing attention from the Conference on Disarmament. But before doing so, let me first say how privileged I am to speak in this plenary under your brilliant presidency. Indeed it cannot be more fitting that a seasoned diplomat of your calibre should be presiding over the crucial closing phase of the Conference's work for 1993. My gratitude also goes to your predecessor, Ambassador Pérez Novoa of Cuba, for his exemplary presidency. May I also take this opportunity to pay tribute to our departing colleagues, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco and Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, with whom I have enjoyed the best of relationships both at official and personal levels? I wish both of them every success in the continuation of their outstanding career.

One of the most topical issues to date is, without doubt, that of the comprehensive test ban. In this regard, let me, at the outset, join other delegations in welcoming the decision taken by the Governments of the United States of America, France and the Russian Federation to prolong the moratoria on their nuclear testing. We further hope that the other nuclear-weapon States will soon join this beautiful concert of silence on the nuclear-testing sites, and thus open the window of opportunity even wider for a definite CTBT. Consistent with its fundamental policy towards the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, to which a CTBT would certainly contribute, Indonesia has always been active in any collective efforts undertaken by the international community with a view to concluding the treaty. During the cold war era, when attempts toward this end through the Conference on Disarmament were stalemated by the super-Powers' rivalry and bloc politics, six non-nuclear-weapons States members of the Conference on Disarmament, namely Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and the former Yugoslavia, launched the initiative to achieve a CTBT through the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty (PTBT), which was eventually held in 1991. Unfortunately, this road too was prevented from reaching its final destination.

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To date, with the positive change in the international political climate, a fresh momentum is gathering for renewed and, hopefully, more serious efforts toward the conclusion of a CTBT. Therefore, alongside the initiative taken in the Conference on Disarmament, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, in his capacity as President of the PTBT amendment conference, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 47/46, called a special meeting of the States parties to the PTBT on 10 and 11 August 1993 in New York, for the express purpose of examining the feasibility of reconvening the amendment conference later this year. The following are the conclusions drawn by the President at the end of the special meeting. Firstly, the special meeting of the States parties to the PTBT directed their attention to the fact that consideration of a CTBT has been under way on three tracks, namely at the Conference on Disarmament, at the amendment conference and in the consultations among the nuclear Powers. Secondly, some delegations attending the meeting expressed their own preference as to the forum in which a CTBT should be pursued. There was none the less a general consensus that the work on a CTBT in the three different forums should be mutually supportive and complementary. Thirdly, the special meeting also welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTBT. Fourthly, the States parties entrusted further the President of the amendment conference with the task of continuing his consultations with the State parties as well as the non-States parties to the PTBT and holding another special meeting early in 1994, in order to review developments and assess the situation regarding a CTBT and to examine the feasibility of resuming the work of the amendment Conference later that year. As far as my delegation is concerned, in view of the capital importance that we attach to a CTBT, we would prefer to keep all options open, particularly at a time when a CTBT has assumed added urgency in relation to the approaching 1995 NPT conference. In my delegation's view, the conclusion of a CTBT will certainly strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime, in particular the vertical aspect of proliferation. It could also serve as a litmus test of the nuclear-weapon States' commitment to nuclear disarmament.

Let me now move to the question of transparency in armaments. From the very beginning, my delegation has seen the merit in the establishment of an international code of conduct on arms transfers as well as military holdings in order to promote confidence among nations, thereby contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in this era of uncertainty. Hence Indonesia was among those who voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L regarding transparency in armaments, in which the Member States agreed inter alia to establish a United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In order to contribute to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, the Indonesian Government is now in the process of collecting armament data and military information as required by the resolution. As soon as this exercise is completed, we shall not fail to submit the relevant data on international arms transfers, military holdings, procurement through national production and any other relevant policies to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We believe that once all United Nations Member States have submitted the information required, the Register will constitute an important instrument for confidence-building among States, especially those in areas of high tension.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

We have, however, to be consistent in addressing the question of transparency in armaments. Any efforts to purposely dilute the aim and arbitrarily reduce the scope of transparency in armaments would run the risk of adversely creating another discriminatory non-proliferation regime, and thus would not be acceptable to my delegation. The same consideration applies to any action to misuse the instrument which would abusively hamper the legitimate access of all countries, especially the developing countries, to advanced technology urgently needed for development purposes. It is within this context that my delegation would like, at this juncture, to reiterate its full support to the statement made on behalf of the majority of the Group of 21 countries, as contained in document CD/TIA/WP.16, which stated that the Conference on Disarmament should address the matter in a non-discriminatory and comprehensive manner, so as to cover all categories and types of arms, including weapons of mass destruction, stockpiles, indigenous production and weapons undergoing research, development, testing and evaluation. By the same token, it is our considered opinion that transparency in armaments should not be treated over-simplistically, but instead should be addressed in such a manner as to take into account the specific characteristics of a given State and its regional environment, as well as its legitimate right to self-defence in conformity with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Being a spread-out archipelagic State consisting of more than 13,000 islands with a population of nearly 200 million, for example, Indonesia's requirements for protecting its territorial integrity and national sovereignty would be necessarily different from those of landlocked countries or more compact States with smaller populations. Furthermore, bearing in mind the complex issues that remain unaddressed surrounding the subject of transparency in armaments, it would be appropriate for us to underline the recommendation of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments that the said Ad Hoc Committee be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Turning to the subject of regional disarmament, first of all I would like to share with the Conference the information that during the 26th ASEAN ministerial meeting held in Singapore last month, the ASEAN countries endorsed a programme of action for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, aimed at maintaining and strengthening such conditions in the new geo-political environment. The meeting also recommended that work on the draft treaty on a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone be intensified. The ASEAN countries will pursue and intensify their consultations with the other regional States, especially with the major Powers, in trying to convince them of the continuing relevance of these concepts, even under the presently changed circumstances, as the only viable framework for greater peace, security and common prosperity, as well as for more harmonious and mutually beneficial relations in the Asia-Pacific region. After taking stock of the growing political and security cooperation in South-East Asia and the strengthened dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN countries have taken another important decision to establish an ASEAN Regional Forum to discuss political and security issues in the area. The ASEAN Regional Forum will, for the first time, invite China, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Russia and

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

Viet Nam to meet ASEAN and its dialogue partners in Bangkok in 1994, in an attempt to find ways and means to promote consultations on regional political and security issues.

Another important issue in the context of our regional security is that of the South China Sea. The South China Sea with its immense strategic importance, the long history of endemic conflicts among its littoral States, the conflicting sovereignty and jurisdictional claims of States, compounded by unresolved questions of the delimitation of territorial seas, continental shelves and exclusive economic zones, and the anticipation of vast mineral and living marine resources in the area, poses a real challenge to our regional security. We therefore consider that the South China Sea could become the next flashpoint in our region. In order to facilitate the concerned and involved States to manage that conflict potential, and thus to contribute to the achievement of a new regional security equilibrium in the post-cold-war era, Indonesia has for quite some time taker the initiative to organize workshops on the South China Sea. The fourth such workshop is now taking place in Surabaya, where remarkable progress since the beginning of the exercise, less than four years ago, has been recorded. In view of this progress, a recommendation has been presented for the possible inclusion in the workshop process of participants from non-regional States that feel they have a vital stake in the South China Sea. For its part, Indonesia hopes that, given the positive trends, the Governments concerned may soon deem it desirable and timely to upgrade the present informal workshop format and engage in a more formal government-to-government dialogue on the matter.

Lastly, allow me to say a few words regarding the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation would like to place on record its sincere appreciation of the painstaking efforts made by Ambassador O'Sullivan, especially considering that the issue involved is extremely delicate. Nevertheless, it would be less than candid on our part not to say that Ambassador O'Sullivan's recommendation is not entirely satisfactory to us. Even though we do not have any major problem with the countries recommended for membership, we honestly believe that the resulting overall composition is somewhat lacking in equitable geographical balance. Therefore, while ready to go along with the emerging consensus, we deem it necessary to stress the importance of dynamically reviewing the question and approaching it gradually, in order to make it more balanced and thus to command an even broader consensus in our future undertaking.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to Mr. Venera, the representative of the Czech Republic.

Mr. VENERA (Czech Republic): Mr. President, it is an honour for me to address this central body of multilateral negotiations on disarmament which works this month under your distinguished and brilliant presidency. Allow me to thank on this occasion Ambassador Pérez Novoa of Cuba for the excellent manner in which he presided over our Conference during the past weeks. The Czech Republic attaches great importance to its deliberations which in the past led to the conclusion of such important disarmament treaties as the

(Mr. Venera, Czech Republic)

non-proliferation Treaty, the partial test-ban Treaty or quite recently the Convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Czechoslovakia participated actively in the elaboration of these agreements and in their application. As one of the successor States to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic we therefore feel associated with what the Conference on Disarmament has achieved so far.

As the Conference concentrated in the past years on the elaboration of the chemical weapons Convention, it should also in the nearest future focus on one or two "promising" issues so that it does not take another decade before new agreements are delivered. The arms race of the cold war period assured a lot of work to be accomplished by institutions like this Conference and it should be accomplished without undue delay. All agenda items should be addressed with equal responsibility. However, some will require longer-term efforts while other tasks seem both urgent as well as achievable in the foreseeable future. A nuclear test ban is an urgent issue since continued nuclear-weapon testing could hardly contribute to the success of the NPT review conference and the required prolongation of the functioning of the Treaty already in 1995. It also seems achievable in view of the constructive approach of the nuclear-weapon States embodied in the ongoing moratorium on nuclear tests. We are looking forward to the early opening of multilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban. They will not need to start from scratch; a number of verification issues of the future test ban have been usefully discussed both in the GSE as well as in the relevant working group. The Czech Republic intends to assure an active participation of its experts in the GSE and its share in the future transmission of seismic data which will be essential for CTB verification.

We share widely expressed views concerning weapons of mass destruction, efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons and their delivery vehicles, arms transfers, transparency in armaments and other confidence-building measures. The Czech Republic is actively participating in a number of groups aimed at relevant export control and we consider joining those multilateral arrangements of which we are not yet full members, like, for instance, the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Australia Group. In this connection we cannot but welcome the enhanced attention the CD is paying to transparency in armaments. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important step in the right direction and the Czech Republic has decided to participate in the first exchange of relevant data in spite of the fact that the separation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic caused us some difficulties in completing the required information. Transparency in armaments may be considered one of the longer-term tasks for the Conference on Disarmament. This, however, does not make it less important. If the right decisions are taken on this path we shall be rewarded in future by enhanced security for all.

Expansion of the CD is one of the issues which had been considered for some 15 years and, as it seems, a number of new CD members are proposed. It apparently comes as no surprise that the Czech Republic is also interested in becoming a CD member State in spite of the fact that we did not hurry with a formal application in this regard. This was the result of the joint proposal

(Mr. Venera, Czech Republic)

that Slovakia should become a successor to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in the Conference on Disarmament. The Czech application for CD membership was postponed precisely in order to create favourable conditions for early admission of the Slovak Republic. We would very much appreciate if this could be taken into account and the Czech Republic offered a possibility to continue to contribute to CD endeavours.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of the Czech Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Ambassador Hoffmann, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Ambassador Hoffmann will introduce to us the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which has been already circulated in document CD/1217.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, under your able guidance, we are reaching important achievements in the CD. On this, the German delegation congratulates you wholeheartedly. As your have already pointed out, I have the honour today to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The report, circulated as document CD/1217 dated 19 August 1993, which is in front of you, covers the activity of the Committee during this year's session. We did our best to keep in line with the IEF guidelines gently prescribed by Ambassador Kamal. In accordance with the mandate given to it by the Conference, the Committee has continued to examine and to identify through substantive consideration issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this context existing agreements as well as relevant proposals, initiatives and developments since the establishment of the Committee in 1985 were taken into account.

Plenary debates and informal consultations were held in an atmosphere of cooperation, for which I want to thank all participating delegations - member States as well as non-member States. Especially I would like to thank the group coordinators: Mr. Henryk Pac for the Eastern European Group, Mr. Carlo Selvaggi for the Western Group, Mr. Farouque for the Group of 21, as well as the representatives of China and Sweden. A special tribute I would like to pay to the Friends of the Chair, Colonels Diachenko, Novosadov and Sukharev of the delegation of the Russian Federation and Mr. Rafael Grossi of the delegation of Argentina, who respectively conducted open-ended consultations on the following important subjects: Confidence-building measures in outer space and terminology and other relevant aspects related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Committee, as in previous years, also benefited from the scientific and technical contributions of experts from the delegations of Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United States of America, to whom I want to express my sincere appreciation. Furthermore I thank Mr. Bogomolov for his impeccable work as Secretary of the Committee and his good advice given under the masterful guidance of Ambassador Berasategui.

As expected during our deliberations, different, sometimes rather opposing views were expressed. The Committee succeeded, however, in its efforts to identify areas of convergence suitable for future work in order to achieve the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The report, therefore,

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

recommends that at the beginning of the 1994 session, the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an appropriate mandate, taking into account the work undertaken since 1985.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Hoffmann, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, for the presentation of his report and congratulate him on behalf of the members of the Conference. I also thank him for the kind words addressed to me. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Ambassador Hoffmann for having brought to a successful conclusion the work of the Ad Hoc Committee devoted to this important subject. I now give the floor to Ambassador Tanaka, the representative of Japan.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, I already took the floor under your presidency last week to make a short intervention, but I did not avail myself of that opportunity to properly greet you. Therefore, let me, at the outset, extend my delegation's heartfelt congratulation to Your Excellency on your assumption of the presidency and assure you of our continued cooperation.

I have taken the floor today to introduce to the Conference the statement relating to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament made by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan in his first policy speech in the Diet on 23 August 1993. The provisional translation of the relevant part of his statement reads as follows:

> "The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an urgent security imperative for Japan and the whole of the global community, and I intend to support the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Going beyond that, I believe world peace depends upon the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons from the earth and global disarmament, and I intend to engage in more active foreign policy efforts to that end."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Tanaka, the representative of Japan, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me as President of this Conference. I now give the floor to Ambassador Ri Cheul, the representative of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Mr. President, my delegation cordially congratulates you on taking up the Chair at this very important stage in the work of the Conference on Disarmament and is sure that, thanks to your competent and devoted efforts, this year's session will be crowned with success.

At the present session there have been marked accomplishments as regards the improvement of the work and the enhancement of the role of the Conference on Disarmament, taking as the starting-point the needs of the international situation and the Conference's own mission.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

The decision taken this year, marking the thirtieth anniversary of the adoption of the partial nuclear test-ban-Treaty by the Conference on Disarmament, to begin negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT), may be described as historic. Its scope is very vast, even though this is but a first step, given the time and efforts devoted to the achievement of this objective. It is common knowledge that nuclear testing involves many politico-military dimensions and immeasurable risks. Nuclear tests themselves represent a most dangerous arms race among the nuclear Powers and constitute a principal source of nuclear arms proliferation. If we do not achieve a halt to all nuclear tests, it will not be possible to avoid nuclear multipolarization, which would enable each of the nuclear Powers to become a pole, and the race for nuclear superiority among a number of poles would lead to a danger incomparable to the era of the bi-polar cold war. Then the moratoriums on nuclear testing announced last year and the decisions to extend the moratoriums on nuclear testing, taken respectively by the United States, the Russian Federation and France, prompted the support and active encouragement of the international community, the States possessing nuclear weapons must certainly have become resigned to the imminence of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

At the present time certain countries have become very active to become permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. When we note that the five countries which are currently permanent members of the Security Council are all nuclear-weapon States, the intentions and the efforts of a country which is already adequately endowed with nuclear facilities and has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons at any time in seeking membership pose a serious problem for the international community. My delegation fully supports the initiative taken by a number of representatives to begin without delay the negotiation of a CTBT, now that conditions and the climate are favourable, and to conclude it in 1995.

For the non-nuclear-weapon countries, particularly the peoples of regions and countries which face a direct nuclear threat, the elimination of such a threat is vital. Even though their demand for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances is properly reflected in a number of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, the nuclear threat against them still persists. The present environment, with the existence of ultra modern war matériel that is subject to no geographical, temporal or spatial restrictions, clearly underscores the effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral conventions and agreements which are much more legally binding. My Government and people have done everything within their power to ward off the nuclear threat, which has constantly been weighing on us for several decades from a distance of a few dozen kilometres within the same territory, and also from far off, from the sea and the air. In this connection I should like to mention talks which were held recently between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America regarding the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsular. At the spring session we referred to the pressures exerted on the pretext of an imaginary "nuclear doubt" concerning my country, and the possibility of finding a solution to this exclusively between our country and the United States, on the basis of the circumstances connected with the origin of the nuclear issue in the Korean

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

peninsular. The historic PDRK-United States negotiations and the joint communiques that were issued demonstrate, explain and underscore many things. Those of the first round in New York last June set out the principles for the solution of the nuclear issue and others pending between the two sides, and the joint declaration which was published constituted a promise of great importance, the first of its kind in the annals of relations between the two countries. This joint communique consists essentially of a promise on the part of the United States regarding assurances against the threat or use of force, including nuclear weapons, against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsular, the preservation of peace and security, mutual respect of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

During the second round of talks, held in Geneva last July, the discussions revolved around practical measures to implement the principles set out in the above-mentioned declaration. One of the significant aspects of the talks in Geneva, as far as we are concerned, is that they proposed the replacement of the existing nuclear facilities using the graphite system by light-water reactors (LWR). This proposal reaffirms and brings out further the policy of the Government of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea as regards the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It also constitutes a testimony of the greatest possible determination to eliminate once and for all the "nuclear suspicion" that exists as far as we are concerned. The attitude to the clear proposal made by my Government, which has for a long time devoted so much effort to resolving the national energy issue on the basis of our own technology and our own resources, this is, more than a technical and financial issue, a political problem relating to the intention really to solve or not to solve the nuclear problem. In the framework of the definitive solution of the nuclear problem and on the assumption that a solution through the provision of light-water reactors is feasible, the United States has declared itself prepared to support the introduction of light-water reactors and to seek the related resources together with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The two sides agreed that the full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards is essential to establish a strong international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It has been our experience that if an international organization jeopardizes the national sovereignty of one of its member countries by violating an agreement concluded with it, if it applies a double standard and if it selects the option of resorting to threats and pressures and turns its back on the possibility of negotiations to resolve the problems that have arisen, it is inevitable that a grave and serious incident will take place which will jeopardize its supreme interests. Our position in favour of a negotiated solution is unchanging now as in the past. The question of partiality will be at the heart of discussions and other related problems will also be raised at our forthcoming consultations with IAEA. We have already received an inspection team from the international agency from the 3rd to the 10th of this month, and an IAEA delegation has been invited to Pyongyang for negotiations scheduled for 31 August.

The implementation of the joint declaration on denuclearization between the North and the South of Korea is one of the fundamental problems to be

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

tackled if we are to resolve the nuclear issue, and this can only be undertaken through dialogue. The breaking off of the North-South talks in this area demonstrates that the desired result cannot be attained unless the political factors impeding the negotiations are fully eliminated. Hence my Government's proposal to replace the special envoys by the North-South summit conference and to enter into the core of the subject to be discussed at the political level, including the nuclear issue. Our partner in the Geneva talks has understood our proposal on this North-South dialogue and has supported it; the two parties have reaffirmed the importance of applying the North-South joint declaration.

The Korean-American talks have opened up prospects for a radical and definitive solution to the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsular and have laid the foundation for improvements in DPRK-United States relations. In this way they have made it possible to alleviate the tense situation in this part of the world where the degree of tension and the risk of conflict were extremely grave, thus contributing appreciably to peace and security in Asia and throughout the rest of our world. If each of the two sides sincerely fulfils its duties, the negotiations will of course be more progressive and productive. The consequences of the cold war will be eliminated once and for all in the Korean peninsula if commitments such as negative security assurances on the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the threat of armed force, including the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, etc., are put into practice. My delegation hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will continue to support and encourage unreservedly the talks at a high governmental level between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, Since this is the first time that I am taking the floor during your presidency, please accept my congratulations and that of my delegation. The Conference is indeed fortunate to be in such capable hands as yours. You have my assurances that the United States delegation stands ready to cooperate fully with your efforts during this important part of the conference, as well as during the period before the 1994 session begins.

I am taking the floor to acknowledge the excellent report that Dr. Ola Dahlman introduced last week, and that we are approving today, on the recent meeting of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). My Government is pleased that preparations for GSETT-3 are well under way. Like others, we attach great importance to this seismic experiment, and the recent GSE report provides important details about the experiment's schedule and preparation. I would like to take this opportunity, as we have done in the past, to stress the importance of wide participation in the upcoming GSETT-3 experiment. Delegations in this room can contribute to its success, but participation across each hemisphere is extremely important.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

My delegation was gratified that the recent GSE session saw many opportunities for valuable exchanges between GSE and the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee. These exchanges continued to show that both bodies have much to gain by interaction and discussion. Accordingly, we believe that it would be worth while for CD delegations to gain a better insight and understanding of the GSE international data centre located in Arlington, Virginia, near Washington D.C. This centre will be used during the upcoming GSETT-3 experiment.

To that end, I have the pleasure to announce that the United States Government is inviting interested heads of CD delegations or their representatives to visit this centre during the upcoming United Nations First Committee session. The United States GSE delegation will host this event, and my Government is looking at the time frame of between 1 November and 4 November. The United States currently envisions that this will be a one-day affair, with CD delegates travelling from New York and returning, at their own expense, for briefings and demonstrations of the capabilities of the international data centre.

The United States delegation believes that such an event will help to go a long way in understanding technical seismic capabilities in the GSETT-3 context, and their possible application to the verification of an eventual comprehensive test-ban treaty. I am happy to extend this verbal invitation and I will follow up with details at a later stage.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Ledogar for his statement, for his invitation to visit the GSE centre and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. Next on my list is Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, Special Coordinator of the CD on the question of the expansion of its membership.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, since I have already had the occasion to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you preside over us, I will simply reiterate our support for your activities and our gratitude for the leadership that you are showing.

I take the floor to clarify some elements of the report I presented on 12 August as the Special Coordinator of the CD for the expansion of its membership. I do so because I understand that with these clarifications a number of delegations would be able to satisfy themselves about the report.

In the report I emphasized that the expansion I proposed should be dynamic and part of a phased approach. The expansion proposed represents consensus on what can be achieved as a first step at present. It follows logically from the concept of a dynamic and phased approach which I proposed that my recommendation is not meant to be exclusionary or static. It would be useful therefore if the concept of expansion of membership continued to be addressed particularly with reference to States whose presence would be significant for the work of the Conference. I recommend, therefore, that the CD would keep the expansion of its membership under review beginning in 1994. In order to do this on as comprehensive a basis as possible, and taking into

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

account those who are already applicants, any other country interested in membership in the CD may apply as soon as possible. Efforts should be made to address these cases as a follow-up to the present expansion. I would also suggest the Conference review its membership at regular intervals, say every 5 or 10 years, in the light of its experience with its initial enlargement and in accordance with rule 2 of the rules of procedure. This would give an assurance that the dynamic approach would continue. As I said on 12 August, my recommendation represents a very delicately balanced package. I hope the foregoing statement will help make it acceptable to all. I request that this statement be included as an integral part of my report on the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador O'Sullivan, Special Coordinator for the expansion of the membership of the CD, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. We have taken note of his request that his statement should be considered an integral part of the report already submitted on this subject.

We have now completed the list of speakers for today. I would like to know if any other delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage. I now call on the representative of the Republic of Tunisia.

Mr. BAATI (Tunisia) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, my delegation has previously extended its congratulations to you on taking up the lofty position of President. We are confident that the present session will achieve a very positive outcome under your leadership. Allow me now to make a short statement in French in connection with the kind exposé by the representative of Australia.

(continued in French)

I would like to thank the Ambassador of Australia, Special Coordinator for the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, for his exposé and in part for his answers to the questions that I raised in plenary on 12 August 1993. First of all I should like to say that my delegation has noted that the membership of the Conference will be periodically reviewed starting in 1994 in order to add new countries which I am sure are all guided solely by the wish to participate in this collective endeavour to create peace and security in the world. It is in that spirit that my country put forward its candidature more than 11 years ago. It was among the first to express its interest in the work of the Conference on Disarmament and in strengthening it as a multilateral negotiating instrument in the field of disarmament on behalf of peace and security. Our candidature falls within the framework of the principles which inspire and guide our diplomacy, principles based on a constant search for negotiated solutions to conflicts and the desire to reduce and eliminate all sources of tension and conflicts.

Our attachment to peace and security has on many occasions been reflected in the prompt signature and swift adoption of the international instruments negotiated in the field of disarmament. Tunisia's participation in the Paris

(Mr. Baati, Tunisia)

Conference and its prompt signing of the Convention on chemical weapons offer further signs of its faith in the effectiveness and solidity of the commitments negotiated in the transparent and multilateral forum of the Conference on Disarmament. This signature corroborates our commitment to work with others for a further reduction in chemical weapons and weapons which represent a source of danger and our desire to promote the establishment of lasting peace and security in the world. At a time when we welcome the latest initiatives by President Clinton followed by those of Presidents Yeltsin and Mitterrand on the extension of the moratorium on nuclear tests and the decision taken by consensus in this Conference to initiate the process aiming at the negotiation of a treaty relating to the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, we cannot conceal our disappointment at seeing Tunisia deprived of the possibility of contributing in a full and proper manner to this collective endeavour as a full member of the Conference on Disarmament. Finally, I should like to add that this matter will continue to be the subject of consultations between Tunisia and certain members of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Tunisia for that statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. We have taken note of the statement. I now call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take the floor in accordance with his own request.

Mr. BAIDINEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, from the very outset I would like to extend my sincere congratulations to you on the assumption of this responsibility at this very juncture. I assure you of the full support and cooperation of my delegation. I would like also to thank Ambassador Novoa of Cuba for the excellent manner in which he presided over our Conference.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has carefully considered the statement which was made by Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan on 12 August in his capacity as Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament for the issue of expansion of its membership. I should really thank Ambassador O'Sullivan for his tireless efforts in this regard. He discharged the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Conference in an effective manner. Having now considered the proposed list annexed to the report, my Government finds that it can go along with the list in its entirety except for one candidate, which is Israel. We believe that its membership can be of no use for our Conference until there would be some changes in its policy, particularly as regards nuclear weapons. In concluding the statement I stress that in our view the concept of expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament is a very logical process towards the enhancement of the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body and enables it to reflect appropriately the new international requirements.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. We have taken due note of his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, representative of Pakistan, has asked to speak.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, in the light of the statement that we have just heard, which appears to imply the possible absence of a consensus on the package approach assumption contained in the report of the Special Coordinator on the important issue of the expansion of the CD, I would suggest that you might like to consider calling an informal plenary meeting of the CD as early as possible so that we can either all reassure ourselves about a satisfactory outcome to this important issue at our final meetings of next week or, if that is not the case, to find some way out within the very short period of time that remains between now and the end of this year's session of the CD, at which we hope a satisfactory solution will be sought to this issue of expansion.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, representative of Pakistan, for his statement, and I now give the floor to Ambassador Abdelhamid Semichi of Algeria.

Mr. SEMICHI (Algeria) (translated from French): The delegation of Algeria supports the proposal just made by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan that the present plenary session should end forthwith to be followed by an informal session of the Conference on Disarmament. I do not want to go into the substance of the consultations to be conducted during the informal session, but I think that they are absolutely essential if we wish to complete all the activities of the Conference on Disarmament on the matter of the expansion of membership of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the Ambassador of Algeria for his statement. I have taken note of the content of the statements made by the Ambassador of Pakistan and by yourself. We still have other items on our agenda to pursue this morning, and we will be considering the request that has been made in a short while.

Now from what I understood, Ambassador O'Sullivan's statement was drawn up as a result of intensive consultations in which all members of the Conference on Disarmament participated, and it therefore reflects the spirit of the dialogue that took place and the way in which our work should proceed on the matter of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. While thanking the Conference for the constructive way in which it has addressed this sensitive matter of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, I would like to comment that there is no solution that is going to be 100 per cent satisfactory to every delegation, but I have the impression that the package we have in front of us is generally acceptable with the exception of some comments that we have just heard, and that therefore the Conference should consider that report at the next plenary meeting - I beg your pardon, I mean at the meeting on 2 September. I realize that there are many sensitivities in connection with the concept of expansion, but the international community has expressed a clear interest in seeing the Conference on Disarmament move along with the developments that have taken place, and expansion represents a concrete attempt to meet this trend. I therefore believe that it is to the common good that we should proceed in the way I have described, and that we should return to this matter at our plenary meeting on 2 September. In the meantime we will continue with our consultations.

(The President)

I now invite the Conference to proceed to the adoption of the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the progress report on the thirty-sixth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, as indicated in document CD/1211, which has been circulated. In accordance with that recommendation, the Ad Hoc Group will be convened from 7 to 18 February 1994 in Geneva, or at any other date that might be most appropriate to the needs and the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It is of course also understood that, depending on the activities of the Conference, it may become necessary for the Ad Hoc Group to meet more frequently than in the past. Accordingly, the proposed dates are subject to adjustment or change whenever the Conference deems necessary. We may also convene the Ad Hoc Group for additional sessions if necessary, and if there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference so decides.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I now invite Ambassador Gerard Errera, representative of France, to take the floor.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to tell you how happy my delegation is to see you presiding over our work at a time that is so critical for the future of the Conference on Disarmament, whether as regards the expansion of the membership or the forthcoming negotiation of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. We wish you all the best in your mission and naturally assure you of the full support of our delegation.

The Conference on Disarmament has just adopted by consensus, paragraph 13 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/1211). On this occasion my delegation would like to stress the following points. As the Chairman of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) himself said at our last plenary meeting, this Group was set up in 1976 and over the last few years has been working on the basis of a project which dates back to that time. As all of us will remember, the nuclear-test-ban treaty envisaged at that time by three countries, provided only for a lightweight, national verification regime. That is why under the seismological network as designed at present the detected data will be retransmitted only to participating States to be analysed by each of them for purposes of national verification.

Today we find ourselves in a new context: the Conference on Disarmament in its recent decision CD/1212, undertook to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which is global and internationally and effectively verifiable, in order to contribute to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. We therefore believe that it is important for the Conference to review the present concept of a seismological network in the light of these criteria and adopt the necessary decisions to ensure that this network can meet the requirements of negotiations on the future treaty. My delegation has taken note of the readiness of the Group of Scientific Experts to change the pace of work it has followed hitherto. But it is not just a matter of the pace at which the Group works - it is the whole of its task which is now indissolubly

(Mr. Errera, France)

linked to the future negotiations. Therefore, in the eyes of my delegation the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has adopted paragraph 13 of the report of the GSE today can in no way prejudge the overall concept of the verification regime for a future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, nor the arrangements for its implementation, which can stem only from the negotiation of such a treaty by the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of France for his statement concerning the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and its relationship with the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as he mentioned, and in that connection I would like to thank the Ambassador of France for the kind words he was good enough to address to the Chair.

(continued in Arabic)

We shall now proceed to discuss the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference which was circulated as document CD/WP.446. In accordance with our practice, we shall take note of that report and those sections in Ambassador Ahmad Kamal's report containing areas of agreement will be adopted as an integral part of the technical sections of the annual report. May I take it that the Conference takes note with appreciation of the report?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): As members know, we have been informed by the delegation of the Russian Federation that His Excellency Andrei Kozyrev, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wishes to address the Conference on Disarmament on Wednesday, 1 September. As you will recall, there are precedents for the Conference holding special meetings to receive high-level visitors on Wednesdays. It is understood that the plenary meeting of the Conference in this case will be devoted exclusively to the statement by the visiting Minister. I am sure that all members are looking forward to the visit by the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation and to listening to his statement. It is suggested that His Excellency will address the Conference at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 1 September. The group meetings will be held later during the same morning, and I am sure that I am expressing the opinion of the whole Conference that this is acceptable to us.

It was so decided.*

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* The plenary meeting scheduled for Wednesday, 1 September was later cancelled as other unavoidable commitments prevented the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from attending.

(Mr. Errera, France)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): Having said this, I would like to invite you to be available at exactly 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 1 September so that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation may deliver his statement without any delay on that day.

May I now turn to another subject? We have not circulated a timetable of meetings to be held next week because we think it is premature to do so now. For the moment, however, in addition to the plenary meeting to be held on Wednesday, on which we have just taken a decision, we shall hold a regular plenary meeting on Thursday, 2 September and a third plenary meeting on Friday, 3 September for the adoption of the annual report and the reports of the subsidiary bodies. We shall see later whether this last meeting, i.e. the meeting on 3 September, will be held in the morning or the afternoon, depending on the progress we make during next week.

As announced earlier the Conference will hold an informal meeting for the consideration of the technical parts of the draft annual report immediately - let us say five minutes after the conclusion of this present plenary. The next plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, as we agreed, will be held at 10 a.m on Wednesday, 1 September.

This plenary meeting stands adjourned and we shall meet in an informal meeting in five minutes.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.